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Actor-Critic Provably Finds Nash Equilibria of
Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Games
Zuyue Fu∗ Zhuoran Yang† Yongxin Chen‡ Zhaoran Wang∗
Abstract
We study discrete-time mean-field Markov games with infinite numbers of
agents where each agent aims to minimize its ergodic cost. We consider the
setting where the agents have identical linear state transitions and quadratic
cost functions, while the aggregated effect of the agents is captured by the pop-
ulation mean of their states, namely, the mean-field state. For such a game,
based on the Nash certainty equivalence principle, we provide sufficient condi-
tions for the existence and uniqueness of its Nash equilibrium. Moreover, to
find the Nash equilibrium, we propose a mean-field actor-critic algorithm with
linear function approximation, which does not require knowing the model of
dynamics. Specifically, at each iteration of our algorithm, we use the single-
agent actor-critic algorithm to approximately obtain the optimal policy of the
each agent given the current mean-field state, and then update the mean-field
state. In particular, we prove that our algorithm converges to the Nash equi-
librium at a linear rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first success
of applying model-free reinforcement learning with function approximation to
discrete-time mean-field Markov games with provable non-asymptotic global
convergence guarantees.
1 Introduction
In reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 2018), an agent learns to make decisions
that minimize its expected total cost through sequential interactions with the environment.
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Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) (Shoham et al., 2003, 2007; Busoniu et al., 2008)
aims to extend RL to sequential decision-making problems involving multiple agents. In a
non-cooperative game, we are interested in the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951), which is a
joint policy of all the agents such that each agent cannot decrease its expected total cost
by unilaterally deviating from its Nash policy. The Nash equilibrium plays a critical role
in understanding the social dynamics of self-interested agents (Ash, 2000; Axtell, 2002) and
constructing the optimal policy of a particular agent via fictitious self-play (Bowling and
Veloso, 2000; Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2009). In the presence of the recent development in
deep learning (LeCun et al., 2015), MARL with function approximation achieves tremendous
empirical successes in applications, including Go (Silver et al., 2016, 2017), Dota (OpenAI,
2018), Star Craft (Vinyals et al., 2019), Poker (Heinrich and Silver, 2016; Moravcˇ´ık et al.,
2017), multi-robotic systems (Yang and Gu, 2004), autonomous driving (Shalev-Shwartz
et al., 2016), and solving social dilemmas (de Cote et al., 2006; Leibo et al., 2017; Hughes
et al., 2018). However, since the capacity of the joint state and action spaces grows exponen-
tially in the number of agents, such MARL approaches become computationally intractable
when the number of agents is large, which is common in real-world applications (Sandholm,
2010; Calderone, 2017; Wang et al., 2017a).
Mean-field game is proposed by Huang et al. (2003, 2006); Lasry and Lions (2006a,b,
2007) with the idea of utilizing mean-field approximation to model the strategic interactions
within a large population. In a mean-field game, each agent has the same cost function and
state transition, which depend on the other agents only through their aggregated effect. As
a result, the optimal policy of each agent depends solely on its own state and the aggregated
effect of the population, and such an optimal policy is symmetric across all the agents.
Moreover, if the aggregated effect of the population corresponds to the Nash equilibrium,
then the optimal policy of each agent jointly constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Although such
a Nash equilibrium corresponds to an infinite number of agents, it well approximates the
Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently large number of agents (Bensoussan et al., 2016). Also,
as the aggregated effect of the population abstracts away the strategic interactions between
individual agents, it circumvents the computational intractability of the MARL approaches
that do not exploit symmetry.
However, most existing work on mean-field games focuses on characterizing the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium rather than designing provably efficient algorithms.
In particular, most existing work considers the continuous-time setting, which requires solv-
ing a pair of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) and Fokker-Planck (FP) equations, whereas
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the discrete-time setting is more common in practice, e.g., in the aforementioned applica-
tions. Moreover, most existing approaches, including the ones based on solving the HJB and
FP equations, require knowing the model of dynamics (Bardi and Priuli, 2014), or having
the access to a simulator, which generates the next state given any state-action pair and
aggregated effect of the population (Guo et al., 2019), which is often unavailable in practice.
To address these challenges, we develop an efficient model-free RL approach to mean-
field game, which provably attains the Nash equilibrium. In particular, we focus on discrete-
time mean-field games with linear state transitions and quadratic cost functions, where the
aggregated effect of the population is quantified by the mean-field state. Such games capture
the fundamental difficulties of general mean-field games and well approximates a variety of
real-world systems such as power grids (Minciardi and Sacile, 2011), swarm robots (Fang,
2014; Araki et al., 2017; Doerr et al., 2018), and financial systems (Zhou and Li, 2000;
Huang and Li, 2018). In detail, based on the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle
(Huang et al., 2006, 2007), we propose a mean-field actor-critic algorithm which, at each
iteration, given the mean-field state µ, approximately attains the optimal policy π∗µ of each
agent, and then updates the mean-field state µ assuming that all the agents follow π∗µ. We
parametrize the actor and critic by linear and quadratic functions, respectively, and prove
that such a parameterization encompasses the optimal policy of each agent. Specifically, we
update the actor parameter using policy gradient (Sutton et al., 2000) and natural policy
gradient (Kakade, 2002; Peters and Schaal, 2008; Bhatnagar et al., 2009) and update the
critic parameter using primal-dual gradient temporal difference (Sutton et al., 2009a,b). In
particular, we prove that given the mean-field state µ, the sequence of policies generated by
the actor converges linearly to the optimal policy π∗µ. Moreover, when alternatingly update
the policy and mean-field state, we prove that the sequence of policies and its corresponding
sequence of mean-field states converge to the unique Nash equilibrium at a linear rate. Our
approach can be interpreted from both “passive” and “active” perspectives: (i) Assuming
that each self-interested agent employs the single-agent actor-critic algorithm, the policy of
each agent converges to the unique Nash policy, which characterizes the social dynamics of a
large population of model-free RL agents. (ii) For a particular agent, our approach serves as
a fictitious self-play method for it to find its Nash policy, assuming the other agents give their
best responses. To the best of our knowledge, our work establishes the first efficient model-
free RL approach with function approximation that provably attains the Nash equilibrium of
a discrete-time mean-field game. As a byproduct, we also show that the sequence of policies
generated by the single-agent actor-critic algorithm converges at a linear rate to the optimal
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policy of a linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) problem in the presence of drift, which may be
of independent interest.
Related Work. Mean-field game is first introduced in Huang et al. (2003, 2006); Lasry
and Lions (2006a,b, 2007). In the last decade, there is growing interest in understanding
continuous-time mean-field games. See, e.g., Gue´ant et al. (2011); Bensoussan et al. (2013);
Gomes et al. (2014); Carmona and Delarue (2013, 2018) and the references therein. Due to
their simple structures, continuous-time linear-quadratic mean-field games are extensively
studied under various model assumptions. See Li and Zhang (2008); Bardi (2011); Wang
and Zhang (2012); Bardi and Priuli (2014); Huang et al. (2016a,b); Bensoussan et al. (2016,
2017); Caines and Kizilkale (2017); Huang and Huang (2017); Moon and Bas¸ar (2018); Huang
and Zhou (2019) for examples of this line of work. Meanwhile, the literature on discrete-
time linear-quadratic mean-field games remains relatively scarce. Most of this line of work
focuses on characterizing the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the behavior of such a
Nash equilibrium when the number of agents goes to infinity (Gomes et al., 2010; Tembine
and Huang, 2011; Moon and Bas¸ar, 2014; Biswas, 2015; Saldi et al., 2018a,b, 2019). See also
Yang et al. (2018a), which applies maximum entropy inverse RL (Ziebart et al., 2008) to infer
the cost function and social dynamics of discrete-time mean-field games with finite state and
action spaces. Our work is most related to Guo et al. (2019), where they propose a mean-
field Q-learning algorithm (Watkins and Dayan, 1992) for discrete-time mean-field games
with finite state and action spaces. Such an algorithm requires the access to a simulator,
which, given any state-action pair and mean-field state, outputs the next state. In contrast,
both our state and action spaces are infinite, and we do not require such a simulator but only
observations of trajectories. Correspondingly, we study the mean-field actor-critic algorithm
with linear function approximation, whereas their algorithm is tailored to the tabular setting.
Also, our work is closely related to Mguni et al. (2018), which focuses on a more restrictive
setting where the state transition does not involve the mean-field state. In such a setting,
mean-field games are potential games, which is, however, not true in more general settings
(Li et al., 2017; Briani and Cardaliaguet, 2018). In comparison, we allow the state transition
to depend on the mean-field state. Meanwhile, they propose a fictitious self-play method
based on the single-agent actor-critic algorithm and establishes its asymptotic convergence.
However, their proof of convergence relies on the assumption that the single-agent actor-critic
algorithm converges to the optimal policy, which is unverified therein. Meanwhile, a model-
based algorithm is proposed in uz Zaman et al. (2019) for the discounted linear-quadratic
mean-field games, where they only show that the algorithm converges asymptotically to the
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Nash equilibrium. In addition, our work is related to Jayakumar and Aditya (2019), where
the proposed algorithm is only shown to converge asymptotically to a stationary point of
the mean-field game.
Our work also extends the line of work on finding the Nash equilibria of Markov games
using MARL. Due to the computational intractability introduced by the large number of
agents, such a line of work focuses on finite-agent Markov games (Littman, 1994, 2001; Hu
and Wellman, 1998; Bowling, 2001; Lagoudakis and Parr, 2002; Hu and Wellman, 2003;
Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007; Perolat et al., 2015; Pe´rolat et al., 2016b,a, 2018; Wei et al.,
2017; Zhang et al., 2018; Zou et al., 2019; Casgrain et al., 2019). See also Shoham et al. (2003,
2007); Busoniu et al. (2008); Li (2018) for detailed surveys. Our work is related to Yang et al.
(2018b), where they combine the mean-field approximation of actions (rather than states)
and Nash Q-learning (Hu and Wellman, 2003) to study general-sum Markov games with a
large number of agents. However, the Nash Q-learning algorithm is only applicable to finite
state and action spaces, and its convergence is established under rather strong assumptions.
Also, when the number of agents goes to infinity, their approach yields a variant of tabular
Q-learning, which is different from our mean-field actor-critic algorithm.
For policy optimization, based on the policy gradient theorem, Sutton et al. (2000);
Konda and Tsitsiklis (2000) propose the actor-critic algorithm, which is later generalized to
the natural actor-critic algorithm (Peters and Schaal, 2008; Bhatnagar et al., 2009). Most
existing results on the convergence of actor-critic algorithms are based on stochastic approx-
imation using ordinary differential equations (Bhatnagar et al., 2009; Castro and Meir, 2010;
Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000; Maei, 2018), which are asymptotic in nature. For policy eval-
uation, the convergence of primal-dual gradient temporal difference is studied in Liu et al.
(2015); Du et al. (2017); Wang et al. (2017b); Yu (2017); Wai et al. (2018). However, this line
of work assumes that the feature mapping is bounded, which is not the case in our setting.
Thus, the existing convergence results are not applicable to analyzing the critic update in
our setting. To handle the unbounded feature mapping, we utilize a truncation argument,
which requires more delicate analysis.
Finally, our work extends the line of work that studies model-free RL for LQR. For
example, Bradtke (1993); Bradtke et al. (1994) show that policy iteration converges to the
optimal policy, Tu and Recht (2017); Dean et al. (2017) study the sample complexity of
least-squares temporal-difference for policy evaluation. More recently, Fazel et al. (2018);
Malik et al. (2018); Tu and Recht (2018) show that the policy gradient algorithm converges
at a linear rate to the optimal policy. See as also Hardt et al. (2016); Dean et al. (2018) for
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more in this line of work. Our work is also closely related to Yang et al. (2019), where they
show that the sequence of policies generated by the natural actor-critic algorithm enjoys a
linear rate of convergence to the optimal policy. Compared with this work, when fixing the
mean-field state, we use the actor-critic algorithm to study LQR in the presence of drift,
which introduces significant difficulties in the analysis. As we show in §3, the drift causes
the optimal policy to have an additional intercept, which makes the state- and action-value
functions more complicated.
Notations. We denote by ‖M‖2 the spectral norm, ρ(M) the spectral radius, σmin(M)
the minimum singular value, and σmax(M) the maximum singular value of a matrix M .
We use ‖α‖2 to represent the ℓ2-norm of a vector α, and (α)ji to denote the sub-vector
(αi, αi+1, . . . , αj)
⊤, where αk is the k-th entry of the vector α. For scalars a1, . . . , an, we
denote by poly(a1, . . . , an) the polynomial of a1, . . . , an, and this polynomial may vary from
line to line. We use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} for any n ∈ N.
2 Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Game
A linear-quadratic mean-field game involves Na ∈ N agents. Their state transitions are given
by
xit+1 = Ax
i
t +Bu
i
t + A ·
1
Na
Na∑
j=1
xjt + d
i + ωit, ∀t ≥ 0, i ∈ [Na],
where xit ∈ Rm and uit ∈ Rk are the state and action vectors of agent i, respectively, the
vector di ∈ Rm is a drift term, and ωit ∈ Rm is an independent random noise term following
the Gaussian distribution N (0,Ψω). The agents are coupled through the mean-field state
1/Na ·
∑Na
j=1 x
j
t . In the linear-quadratic mean-field game, the cost of agent i ∈ [Na] at time
t ≥ 0 is given by
cit = (x
i
t)
⊤Qxit + (u
i
t)
⊤Ruit +
(
1
Na
Na∑
j=1
xjt
)⊤
Q
(
1
Na
Na∑
j=1
xjt
)
,
where uit is generated by π
i, i.e., the policy of agent i. To measure the performance of agent
i following its policy πi under the influence of the other agents, we define the expected total
cost of agent i as
J i(π1, π2, . . . , πNa) = lim
T→∞
E
(
1
T
T∑
t=0
cit
)
.
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We are interested in finding a Nash equilibrium (π1, π2, . . . , πNa), which is defined by
J i(π1, . . . , πi−1, πi, πi+1, . . . , πNa) ≤ J i(π1, . . . , πi−1, π˜i, πi+1, . . . , πNa), ∀π˜i, i ∈ [Na].
That is, agent i cannot further decrease its expected total cost by unilaterally deviating from
its Nash policy.
For the simplicity of discussion, we assume that the drift term di is identical for each
agent. By the symmetry of the agents in terms of their state transitions and cost functions,
we focus on a fixed agent and drop the superscript i hereafter. Further taking the infinite-
population limit Na → ∞ leads to the following formulation of linear-quadratic mean-field
game (LQ-MFG).
Problem 2.1 (LQ-MFG). We consider the following formulation,
xt+1 = Axt + But + AEx
∗
t + d+ ωt,
c(xt, ut) = x
⊤
t Qxt + u
⊤
t Rut + (Ex
∗
t )
⊤Q(Ex∗t ),
J(π) = lim
T→∞
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=0
c(xt, ut)
]
,
where xt ∈ Rm is the state vector, ut ∈ Rk is the action vector generated by the policy π,
{x∗t}t≥0 is the trajectory generated by a Nash policy π∗ (assuming it exists), ωt ∈ Rm is an
independent random noise term following the Gaussian distribution N (0,Ψω), and d ∈ Rm
is a drift term. Here the expectation Ex∗t is taken across all the agents. We aim to find π
∗
such that J(π∗) = infπ∈Π J(π).
The formulation in Problem 2.1 is studied by Lasry and Lions (2007); Bensoussan et al.
(2016); Saldi et al. (2018a,b). We propose a more general formulation in Problem C.1 (see §C
of the appendix for details), where an additional interaction term between the state vector
xt and the mean-field state Ex
∗
t is incorporated into the cost function. According to our
analysis in §C, up to minor modification, the results in the following sections also carry over
to Problem C.1. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on Problem 2.1 in the sequel.
Note that the mean-field state Ex∗t converges to a constant vector µ
∗ as t → ∞, which
serves as a fixed mean-field state, since the Markov chain of states generated by the Nash
policy π∗ admits a stationary distribution. As we consider the ergodic setting, it suffices
to study Problem 2.1 with t sufficiently large, which motivates the following drifted LQR
(D-LQR) problem, where the mean-field state acts as another drift term.
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Problem 2.2 (D-LQR). Given a mean-field state µ ∈ Rm, we consider the following formu-
lation,
xt+1 = Axt +But + Aµ+ d+ ωt,
cµ(xt, ut) = x
⊤
t Qxt + u
⊤
t Rut + µ
⊤Qµ,
Jµ(π) = lim
T→∞
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=0
cµ(xt, ut)
]
,
where xt ∈ Rm is the state vector, ut ∈ Rk is the action vector generated by the policy π, ωt ∈
R
m is an independent random noise term following the Gaussian distribution N (0,Ψω), and
d ∈ Rm is a drift term. We aim to find an optimal policy π∗µ such that Jµ(π∗µ) = infπ∈Π Jµ(π).
For the mean-field state µ = µ∗, which corresponds to the Nash equilibrium, solving
Problem 2.2 gives π∗µ∗ , which coincides with the Nash policy π
∗ defined in Problem 2.1.
Compared with the most studied LQR problem (Lewis et al., 2012), both the state transition
and the cost function in Problem 2.2 have drift terms, which act as the mean-field “force” that
drives the states away from zero. Such a mean-field “force” introduces additional challenges
when solving Problem 2.2 in the model-free setting (see §3.3 for details). On the other hand,
the unique optimal policy π∗µ of Problem 2.2 admits a linear form π
∗
µ(xt) = −Kπ∗µxt + bπ∗µ
(Anderson and Moore, 2007), where the matrix Kπ∗µ ∈ Rk×m and the vector bπ∗µ ∈ Rk are
the parameters of π∗µ. Motivated by such a linear form of the optimal policy, we define the
class of linear-Gaussian policies as
Π = {π(x) = −Kx+ b+ σ · η : K ∈ Rk×m, b ∈ Rk}, (2.1)
where the standard Gaussian noise term η ∈ Rk is included to encourage exploration. To
solve Problem 2.2, it suffices to find the optimal policy π∗µ within Π.
Now, we introduce the definition of the Nash equilibrium pair (Saldi et al., 2018a,b). The
Nash equilibrium pair is characterized by the NCE principle, which states that it suffices to
find a pair of π∗ and µ∗, such that the policy π∗ is optimal for each agent when the mean-field
state is µ∗, while all the agents following the policy π∗ generate the mean-field state µ∗ as
t → ∞. To present its formal definition, we define Λ1(µ) as the optimal policy in Π given
the mean-field state µ, and define Λ2(µ, π) as the mean-field state generated by the policy π
given the current mean-field state µ as t→∞.
Definition 2.3 (Nash Equilibrium Pair). The pair (µ∗, π∗) ∈ Rm × Π constitutes a Nash
equilibrium pair of Problem 2.1 if it satisfies π∗ = Λ1(µ
∗) and µ∗ = Λ2(µ
∗, π∗). Here µ∗ is
called the Nash mean-field state and π∗ is called the Nash policy.
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3 Mean-Field Actor-Critic
We first characterize the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium pair of Problem
2.1 under mild regularity conditions, and then propose a mean-field actor-critic algorithm
to obtain such a Nash equilibrium. As a building block of the mean-field actor-critic, we
propose the natural actor-critic to solve Problem 2.2.
3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Pair
We now establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium pair defined in
Definition 2.3. We impose the following regularity conditions.
Assumption 3.1. We assume that the following statements hold:
(i) The algebraic Riccati equation X = A⊤XA+Q−A⊤XB(B⊤XB +R)−1B⊤XA admits
a unique symmetric positive definite solution X∗;
(ii) It holds for L0 = L1L3 + L2 that L0 < 1, where
L1 =
∥∥[(I − A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1A∥∥
2
· ∥∥[K∗Q−1(I − A)⊤ − R−1B⊤]∥∥
2
,
L2 =
[
1− ρ(A−BK∗)]−1 · ‖A‖2, L3 = [1− ρ(A− BK∗)]−1 · ‖B‖2.
Here K∗ = −(B⊤X∗B +R)−1B⊤X∗A.
The first assumption is implied by mild regularity conditions on the matrices A, B, Q,
and R. See Theorem 3.2 in De Souza et al. (1986) for details. The second assumption is
standard in the literature (Bensoussan et al., 2016; Saldi et al., 2018b), which ensures the
stability of the LQ-MFG. In the following proposition, we show that Problem 2.1 admits a
unique Nash equilibrium pair.
Proposition 3.2 (Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Pair). Under Assumption
3.1, the operator Λ(·) = Λ2(·,Λ1(·)) is L0-Lipschitz, where L0 is given in Assumption 3.1.
Moreover, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium pair (µ∗, π∗) of Problem 2.1.
Proof. See §E.1 for a detailed proof.
3.2 Mean-Field Actor-Critic for LQ-MFG
The NCE principle motivates a fixed-point approach to solve Problem 2.1, which generates
a sequence of policies {πs}s≥0 and mean-field states {µs}s≥0 satisfying the following two
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properties: (i) Given the mean-field state µs, the policy πs is optimal. (ii) The mean-field
state becomes µs+1 as t→ ∞, if all the agents follow πs under the current mean-field state
µs. Here (i) requires solving Problem 2.2 given the mean-field state µs, while (ii) requires
simulating the agents following the policy πs given the current mean-field µs. Based on such
properties, we propose the mean-field actor-critic in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Mean-Field Actor-Critic for solving LQ-MFG.
1: Input:
• Initial mean-field state µ0 and Initial policy π0 with parameters K0 and b0.
• Numbers of iterations S, {Ns}s∈[S], {Hs}s∈[S], {T˜s,n, Ts,n}s∈[S],n∈[Ns],
{T˜ bs,h, T bs,h}s∈[S],h∈[Hs].
• Stepsizes {γs}s∈[S], {γbs}s∈[S], {γs,n,t}s∈[S],n∈[Ns],t∈[Ts,n], {γbs,h,t}s∈[S],h∈[Hs],t∈[T bs,h].
2: for s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , S − 1 do
3: Policy Update: Solve for the optimal policy πs+1 with parameters Ks+1 and bs+1 of
Problem 2.2 via Algorithm 2 with µs, πs, Ns, Hs, {T˜s,n, Ts,n}n∈[Ns], {T˜ bs,h, T bs,h}h∈[Hs], γs,
γbs, {γs,n,t}n∈[Ns],t∈[Ts,n], and {γbs,h,t}h∈[Hs],t∈[T bs,h], which gives the estimated mean-field
state µ̂Ks+1,bs+1.
4: Mean-Field State Update: Update the mean-field state via µs+1 ← µ̂Ks+1,bs+1.
5: end for
6: Output: Pair (πS , µS).
Algorithm 1 requires solving Problem 2.2 at each iteration to obtain πs = Λ1(µs) and
µs+1 = Λ2(µs, πs). To this end, we introduce the natural actor-critic in §3.3 that solves
Problem 2.2.
3.3 Natural Actor-Critic for D-LQR
Now we focus on solving Problem 2.2 for a fixed mean-field state µ, we thus drop the subscript
µ hereafter. We write πK,b(x) = −Kx+b+ση to emphasize the dependence on K and b, and
J(K, b) = J(πK,b) consequently. Now, we propose the natural actor-critic to solve Problem
2.2.
For any policy πK,b ∈ Π, by the state transition in Problem 2.2, we have
xt+1 = (A− BK)xt + (Bb+ Aµ+ d) + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N (0,Ψǫ), (3.1)
where Ψǫ = σBB
⊤+Ψω. It is known that if ρ(A−BK) < 1, then the Markov chain {xt}t≥0
induced by (3.1) has a unique stationary distribution N (µK,b,ΦK) (Anderson and Moore,
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2007), where the mean-field state µK,b and the covariance ΦK satisfy that
µK,b = (I − A+BK)−1(Bb+ Aµ+ d), (3.2)
ΦK = (A− BK)ΦK(A− BK)⊤ +Ψǫ. (3.3)
Meanwhile, the Bellman equation for Problem 2.2 takes the following form
PK = (Q+K
⊤RK) + (A−BK)⊤PK(A− BK). (3.4)
Then by calculation (see Proposition B.2 in §B.1 of the appendix for details), it holds that
the expected total cost J(K, b) is decomposed as
J(K, b) = J1(K) + J2(K, b) + σ
2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ, (3.5)
where J1(K) and J2(K, b) are defined as
J1(K) = tr
[
(Q+K⊤RK)ΦK
]
= tr(PKΨǫ),
J2(K, b) =
(
µK,b
b
)⊤(
Q+K⊤RK −K⊤R
−RK R
)(
µK,b
b
)
. (3.6)
Here J1(K) is the expected total cost in the most studied LQR problems (Yang et al., 2019;
Fazel et al., 2018), where the state transition does not have drift terms. Meanwhile, J2(K, b)
corresponds to the expected cost induced by the drift terms. The following two propositions
characterize the properties of J2(K, b).
First, we show that J2(K, b) is strongly convex in b.
Proposition 3.3. Given any K, the function J2(K, b) is νK-strongly convex in b. Here
νK = σmin(Y
⊤
1,KY1,K + Y
⊤
2,KY2,K), where Y1,K = R
1/2K(I − A + BK)−1B − R1/2 and Y2,K =
Q1/2(I − A + BK)−1B. Also, J2(K, b) has ιK-Lipschitz continuous gradient in b, where ιK
is upper bounded as ιK ≤ [1− ρ(A− BK)]−2 · (‖B‖22 · ‖K‖22 · ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · ‖Q‖2).
Proof. See §E.4 for a detailed proof.
Second, we show that minb J2(K, b) is independent of K.
Proposition 3.4. We define bK = argminb J2(K, b), where J2(K, b) is defined in (3.6). It
holds that
bK =
[
KQ−1(I −A)⊤ − R−1B⊤] · [(I − A)Q−1(I −A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1 · (Aµ+ d).
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Moreover, J2(K, b
K) takes the form of
J2(K, b
K) = (Aµ+ d)⊤
[
(I −A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1 · (Aµ+ d),
which is independent of K.
Proof. See §E.2 for a detailed proof.
Since minb J2(K, b) is independent of K by Proposition 3.4, it holds that the optimal K
∗
is the same as argminK J1(K). This motivates us to minimize J(K, b) by first updating K
following the gradient direction ∇KJ1(K) to the optimal K∗, then updating b following the
gradient direction ∇bJ2(K∗, b). We now design our algorithm based on this idea.
We define ΥK , pK,b, and qK,b as
ΥK =
(
Q + A⊤PKA A
⊤PKB
B⊤PKA R +B
⊤PKB
)
=
(
Υ11K Υ
12
K
Υ21K Υ
22
K
)
,
pK,b = A
⊤
[
PK · (Aµ+ d) + fK,b
]
, qK,b = B
⊤
[
PK · (Aµ+ d) + fK,b
]
, (3.7)
where fK,b = (I − A + BK)−⊤[(A− BK)⊤PK(Bb+ Aµ + d)−K⊤Rb]. By calculation (see
Proposition B.3 in §B.1 of the appendix for details), the gradients of J1(K) and J2(K, b)
take the forms of
∇KJ1(K) = 2(Υ22KK −Υ21K ) · ΦK , ∇bJ2(K, b) = Υ22K (−KµK,b + b) + Υ21KµK,b + qK,b.
Our algorithm follows the natural actor-critic method (Bhatnagar et al., 2009) and actor-
critic method (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000). Specifically, (i) To obtain the optimal K∗, in
the critic update step, we estimate the matrix ΥK by Υ̂K via a policy evaluation algorithm,
e.g., Algorithm 3 or Algorithm 4 (see §B.2 and §B.3 of the appendix for details); in the actor
update step, we update K via K ← K−γ · (Υ̂22KK− Υ̂21K ), where the term Υ̂22KK− Υ̂21K is the
estimated natural gradient. (ii) To obtain the optimal b∗ given K∗, in the critic update step,
we estimate ΥK∗, qK∗,b, and µK∗,b by Υ̂K∗ , q̂K∗,b, and µ̂K∗,b via a policy evaluation algorithm;
In the actor update step, we update b via b ← b − γ · ∇̂bJ2(K∗, b), where ∇̂bJ2(K∗, b) =
Υ̂22K∗(−K∗µ̂K∗,b + b) + Υ̂21K∗µ̂K∗,b + q̂K∗,b is the estimated gradient. Combining the above
procedure, we obtain the natural actor-critic for Problem 2.2, which is stated in Algorithm
2.
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Algorithm 2 Natural Actor-Critic Algorithm for D-LQR.
1: Input:
• Mean-field state µ and initial policy πK0,b0.
• Numbers of iterations N , H , {T˜n, Tn}n∈[N ], {T˜ bh, T bh}h∈[H].
• Stepsizes γ, γb, {γn,t}n∈[N ],t∈[Tn], {γbh,t}h∈[H],t∈[T bh].
2: for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 do
3: Critic Update: Compute Υ̂Kn via Algorithm 3 with πKn,b0 , µ, T˜n,Tn, {γn,t}t∈[Tn], K0,
and b0 as inputs.
4: Actor Update: Update the parameter via
Kn+1 ← Kn − γ · (Υ̂22KnKn − Υ̂21Kn).
5: end for
6: for h = 0, 1, 2, . . . , H − 1 do
7: Critic Update: Compute µ̂KN ,bh, Υ̂KN , q̂KN ,bh via Algorithm 3 with πKN ,bh, µ, T˜
b
h,
T bh, {γbh,t}t∈[T bh ], K0, and b0.
8: Actor Update: Update the parameter via
bh+1 ← bh − γb ·
[
Υ̂22KN (−KN µ̂K,bh + bh) + Υ̂21KN µ̂KN ,bh + q̂KN ,bh
]
.
9: end for
10: Output: Policy πK,b = πKN ,bH , estimated mean-field state µ̂K,b = µ̂KN ,bH .
4 Global Convergence Results
The following theorem establishes the rate of convergence of Algorithm 1 to the Nash equi-
librium pair (µ∗, π∗) of Problem 2.1.
Theorem 4.1 (Convergence of Algorithm 1). For a sufficiently small tolerance ε > 0, we
set the number of iterations S in Algorithm 1 such that
S >
log
(‖µ0 − µ∗‖2 · ε−1)
log(1/L0)
. (4.1)
For any s ∈ [S], we define
εs = min
{[
1− ρ(A−BK∗)]4(‖B‖2 + ‖A‖2)−4(‖µs‖−22 + ‖d‖−22 ) · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ε2,
νK∗ ·
[
1− ρ(A−BK∗)]4 · ‖B‖−22 ·Mb(µs) · ε2, ε} · 2−s−10, (4.2)
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where νK∗ is defined in Proposition 3.3 and
Mb(µs) = 4
∥∥∥Q−1(I − A)⊤ · [(I − A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1 · (Aµs + d)∥∥∥
2
· [ν−1K∗ + σ−1min(Ψǫ) · σ−1min(R)]1/2. (4.3)
In the s-th policy update step in Line 3 of Algorithm 1, we set the inputs via Theorem
B.4 such that Jµs(πs+1) − Jµs(π∗µs) < εs, where the expected total cost Jµs(·) is defined in
Problem 2.2, and π∗µs = Λ1(µs) is the optimal policy under the mean-field state µs. Then it
holds with probability at least 1− ε5 that
‖µS − µ∗‖2 ≤ ε, ‖KS −K∗‖F ≤ ε, ‖bS − b∗‖2 ≤ (1 + L1) · ε.
Here µ∗ is the Nash mean-field state, KS and bS are parameters of the policy πS, and K
∗
and b∗ are parameters of the Nash policy π∗.
Proof. See §D.1 for a detailed proof.
We highlight that if the inputs of Algorithm 1 satisfy the conditions stated in Theorem
B.4, it holds that Jµs(πs+1)− Jµs(π∗µs) < εs for any s ∈ [S]. See Theorem B.4 in §B.1 of the
appendix for details. By Theorem 4.1, Algorithm 1 converges linearly to the unique Nash
equilibrium pair (µ∗, π∗) of Problem 2.1. To the best of our knowledge, this theorem is the
first successful attempt to establish that reinforcement learning with function approximation
finds the Nash equilibrium pairs in mean-field games with theoretical guarantee, which lays
the theoretical foundations for applying modern reinforcement learning techniques to general
mean-field games.
5 Conclusion
For the discrete-time linear-quadratic mean-field games, we provide sufficient conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium pair. Moreover, we propose the mean-
field actor-critic algorithm with linear function approximation that is shown converges to the
Nash equilibrium pair with linear rate of convergence. Our algorithm can be modified to use
other parametrized function classes, including deep neural networks, for solving mean-field
games. For future research, we aim to extend our algorithm to other variations of mean-field
games including risk-sensitive mean-field games (Saldi et al., 2018a; Tembine et al., 2014),
robust mean-field games (Bauso et al., 2016), and partially observed mean-field games (Saldi
et al., 2019).
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A Notations in the Appendix
In the proof, for convenience, for any invertible matrix M , we denote by M−⊤ = (M−1)⊤ =
(M⊤)−1 and ‖M‖F the Frobenius norm. We also denote by svec(M) the symmetric vec-
torization of the symmetric matrix M , which is the vectorization of the upper triangular
matrix of the symmetric matrix M , with off-diagonal entries scaled by
√
2. We denote by
smat(·) the inverse operation. For any matrices G and H , we denote by G⊗H the Kronecker
product, and G⊗sH the symmetric Kronecker product, which is defined as a mapping on a
vector svec(M) such that (G⊗s H)svec(M) = 1/2 · svec(HMG⊤ + GMH⊤).
For notational simplicity, we write Eπ(·) to emphasize that the expectation is taken
following the policy π.
B Auxiliary Algorithms and Analysis
B.1 Results in D-LQR
In this section, we provide auxiliary results in analyzing Problem 2.2. First, we introduce the
value functions of the Markov decision process (MDP) induced by Problem 2.2. We define
the state- and action-value functions VK,b(x) and QK,b(x, u) as follows
VK,b(x) =
∞∑
t=0
{
E
[
c(xt, ut) | x0 = x
]− J(K, b)}, (B.1)
QK,b(x, u) = c(x, u)− J(K, b) + E
[
VK,b(x1) | x0 = x, u0 = u
]
, (B.2)
where xt follows the state transition, and ut follows the policy πK,b given xt. In other words,
we have ut = −Kxt+ b+ σηt, where ηt ∼ N (0, I). The following proposition establishes the
close forms of these value functions.
Proposition B.1. The state-value function VK,b(x) takes the form of
VK,b(x) = x
⊤PKx− tr(PKΦK) + 2f⊤K,b(x− µK,b)− µ⊤K,bPKµK,b, (B.3)
and the action-value function QK,b(x, u) takes the form of
QK,b(x, u) =
(
x
u
)⊤
ΥK
(
x
u
)
+ 2
(
pK,b
qK,b
)⊤(
x
u
)
− tr(PKΦK)− σ2 · tr(R + PKBB⊤)
− b⊤Rb+ 2b⊤RKµK,b − µ⊤K,b(Q+K⊤RK + PK)µK,b
+ 2f⊤K,b
[
(Aµ+ d)− µK,b
]
+ (Aµ+ d)⊤PK(Aµ+ d), (B.4)
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where fK,b = (I − A + BK)−⊤[(A − BK)⊤PK(Bb + Aµ + d) −K⊤Rb], and ΥK , pK,b, and
qK,b are defined in (3.7).
Proof. See §E.6 for a detailed proof.
By Proposition B.1, we know that VK,b(x) is quadratic in x, while QK,b(x, u) is quadratic
in (x⊤, u⊤)⊤. Now, we show that (3.5) holds.
Proposition B.2. The expected total cost J(K, b) defined in Problem 2.2 takes the form
of
J(K, b) = J1(K) + J2(K, b) + σ
2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ,
where
J1(K) = tr
[
(Q+K⊤RK)ΦK
]
= tr(PKΨǫ),
J2(K, b) =
(
µK,b
b
)⊤(
Q+K⊤RK −K⊤R
−RK R
)(
µK,b
b
)
.
Here µK,b is defined in (3.2), ΦK is defined in (3.3), and PK is defined in (3.4).
Proof. See §E.3 for a detailed proof.
The following proposition establishes the gradients of J1(K) and J2(K, b), respectively.
Proposition B.3. The gradient of J1(K) and the gradient of J2(K, b) with respect to b take
the forms of
∇KJ1(K) = 2(Υ22KK −Υ21K ) · ΦK , ∇bJ2(K, b) = 2
[
Υ22K (−KµK,b + b) + Υ21KµK,b + qK,b
]
,
where ΥK and qK,b are defined in (3.7).
Proof. See §E.5 for a detailed proof.
The following theorem establishes the convergence of Algorithm 2.
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Theorem B.4 (Convergence of Algorithm 2). Assume that ρ(A−BK0) < 1. Let ε > 0 be
a sufficiently small tolerance. We set
γ ≤ [‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · J(K0, b0) · σ−1min(Ψǫ)]−1,
N ≥ C · ‖ΦK∗‖2 · γ−1 · log
{
4
[
J(K0, b0)− J(K∗, b∗)
] · ε−1},
Tn ≥ poly
(‖Kn‖F, ‖b0‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · λ−4Kn · [1− ρ(A−BKn)]−9 · ε−5,
T˜n ≥ poly
(‖Kn‖F, ‖b0‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · λ−2Kn · [1− ρ(A−BKn)]−12 · ε−12,
γn,t = γ0 · t−1/2,
γb ≤ min
{
1− ρ(A− BKN),
[
1− ρ(A− BKN)
]−2 · (‖B‖22 · ‖KN‖22 · ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · ‖Q‖2)},
H ≥ C0 · ν−1KN · (γb)−1 · log
{
4
[
J(KN , b0)− J(KN , bKN )
] · ε−1},
T bh ≥ poly
(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(KN , b0)) · λ−4KN · ν−4KN · [1− ρ(A−BKN )]−11 · ε−5,
T˜ bh ≥ poly
(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(KN , b0)) · λ−4KN · ν−2KN · [1− ρ(A−BKN )]−17 · ε−8,
γbh,t = γ0 · t−1/2,
where C, C0, and γ0 are positive absolute constants, {Kn}n∈[N ] and {bh}h∈[H] are the se-
quences generated by Algorithm 2, λKn is specified in Proposition B.6, and νKN is specified
in Proposition 3.3. Then it holds with probability at least 1− ε10 that
J(KN , bH)− J(K∗, b∗) < ε, ‖bH − b∗‖2 ≤ Mb(µ) · ε1/2,
‖KN −K∗‖F ≤
[
σ−1min(Ψǫ) · σ−1min(R) · ε
]1/2
, ‖µ̂KN ,bH − µK∗,b∗‖2 ≤ ε,
where Mb(µ) is defined in (4.3).
Proof. See §D.2 for a detailed proof.
By Theorem B.4, given any mean-field state µ, Algorithm 2 converges linearly to the
optimal policy π∗µ of Problem 2.2.
B.2 Primal-Dual Policy Evaluation Algorithm
Note that the critic update steps in Algorithm 2 are built upon the estimators of the matrix
ΥK and the vector qK,b. We now derive a policy evaluation algorithm to establish the
estimators of ΥK and qK,b, which is based on gradient temporal difference algorithm (Sutton
et al., 2009a).
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We define the feature vector as
ψ(x, u) =
 ϕ(x, u)x− µK,b
u− (−KµK,b + b)
 , (B.5)
where
ϕ(x, u) = svec
[(
x− µK,b
u− (−KµK,b + b)
)(
x− µK,b
u− (−KµK,b + b)
)⊤]
.
Recall svec(M) gives the symmetric vectorization of the symmetric matrixM . We also define
αK,b =
 svec(ΥK)
ΥK
(
µK,b
−KµK,b + b
)
+
(
pK,b
qK,b
) , (B.6)
where ΥK , pK,b, and qK,b are defined in (3.7). To estimate ΥK and qK,b, it suffices to estimate
αK,b. Meanwhile, we define
ΘK,b = EπK,b
{
ψ(x, u)
[
ψ(x, u)− ψ(x′, u′)]⊤}, (B.7)
where (x′, u′) is the state-action pair after (x, u) following the policy πK,b and the state
transition. The following proposition characterizes the connection between ΘK,b and αK,b.
Proposition B.5. It holds that(
1 0
EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ΘK,b
)(
J(K, b)
αK,b
)
=
(
J(K, b)
EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]) ,
where ψ(x, u) is defined in (B.5), αK,b is defined in (B.6), and ΘK,b is defined in (B.7).
Proof. See §E.7 for a detailed proof.
By Proposition B.5, to obtain αK,b, it suffices to solve the following linear system in
ζ = (ζ1, ζ
⊤
2 )
⊤,
Θ˜K,b · ζ =
(
J(K, b)
EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]) , (B.8)
where for notational convenience, we define
Θ˜K,b =
(
1 0
EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ΘK,b
)
. (B.9)
The following proposition shows that ΘK,b is invertible.
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Proposition B.6. If ρ(A−BK) < 1, then the matrix ΘK,b is invertible, and ‖ΘK,b‖2 ≤ 4(1+
‖K‖2F)2 · ‖ΦK‖22. Also, σmin(Θ˜K,b) ≥ λK , where λK only depends on ‖K‖2 and ρ(A−BK).
Proof. See §E.8 for a detailed proof.
By Proposition B.6, ΘK,b is invertible. Therefore, (B.8) admits the unique solution
ζK,b = (J(K, b), α
⊤
K,b)
⊤.
Now, we present the primal-dual gradient temporal difference algorithm.
Primal-Dual Gradient Method. Instead of solving (B.8) directly, we minimize the fol-
lowing loss function with respect to ζ = ((ζ1)⊤, (ζ2)⊤),[
ζ1 − J(K, b)]2 + ∥∥∥EπK,b[ψ(x, u)]ζ1 +ΘK,bζ2 − EπK,b[c(x, u)ψ(x, u)]∥∥∥2
2
. (B.10)
By Fenchel’s duality, the minimization of (B.10) is equivalent to the following primal-dual
min-max problem,
min
ζ∈Vζ
max
ξ∈Vξ
F (ζ, ξ) =
{
EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ζ1 +ΘK,bζ
2 − EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]}⊤
ξ2 (B.11)
+
[
ζ1 − J(K, b)] · ξ1 − ‖ξ‖22/2,
where we restrict the primal variable ζ in a compact set Vζ and the dual variable ξ in a
compact set Vξ, which are specified in Definition B.7. It holds that
∇ζ1F = ξ1 + EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]⊤
ξ2, ∇ζ2F = Θ⊤K,bξ2, ∇ξ1F = ζ1 − J(K, b)− ξ1,
∇ξ2F = EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ζ1 +ΘK,bζ
2 − EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]− ξ2. (B.12)
The primal-dual gradient method updates ζ and ξ via
ζ1 ← ζ1 − γ · ∇ζ1F (ζ, ξ), ζ2 ← ζ2 − γ · ∇ζ2F (ζ, ξ)
ξ1 ← ξ1 − γ · ∇ξ1F (ζ, ξ), ξ2 ← ξ2 − γ · ∇ξ2F (ζ, ξ). (B.13)
Estimation of Mean-Field State µK,b. To utilize the primal-dual gradient method in
(B.13), it remains to evaluate the feature vector ψ(x, u). Note that by (B.5), the evaluation
of the feature vector ψ(x, u) requires the mean-field state µK,b. In what follows, we establish
the estimator µ̂K,b of the mean-field state µK,b by simulating the MDP following the policy
πK,b for T˜ steps, and calculate the estimated feature vector ψ̂(x, u) by
ψ̂(x, u) =
 ϕ̂(x, u)x− µ̂K,b
u− (−Kµ̂K,b + b)
 , (B.14)
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where ϕ̂(x, u) takes the form of
ϕ̂(x, u) = svec
[(
x− µ̂K,b
u− (−Kµ̂K,b + b)
)(
x− µ̂K,b
u− (−Kµ̂K,b + b)
)⊤]
.
We now define the sets Vζ and Vξ in (B.11).
Definition B.7. Given K0 and b0 such that ρ(A−BK0) < 1 and J(K0, b0) <∞, we define
the sets Vζ and Vξ as
Vζ =
{
ζ : 0 ≤ ζ1 ≤ J(K0, b0), ‖ζ2‖2 ≤Mζ,1 +Mζ,2 · (1 + ‖K‖F) ·
[
1− ρ(A−BK)]−1},
Vξ =
{
ξ : |ξ1| ≤ J(K0, b0), ‖ξ2‖2 ≤Mξ ·
(
1 + ‖K‖2F
)3 · [1− ρ(A− BK)]−1}.
Here Mζ,1, Mζ,2, and Mξ are constants independent of K and b, which take the forms of
Mζ,1 =
[(‖Q‖F + ‖R‖F)+ (‖A‖2F + ‖B‖2F) · √d · J(K0, b0) · σ−1min(Ψω)]
+
(‖A‖2 + ‖B‖2) · J(K0, b0)2 · σ−1min(Ψω) · σ−1min(Q),
+
[(‖Q‖2 + ‖R‖2)+ (‖A‖2 + ‖B‖2)2 · J(K0, b0) · σ−1min(Ψω)]
· J(K0, b0) ·
[
σ−1min(Q) + σ
−1
min(R)
]
Mζ,2 =
(‖A‖2 + ‖B‖2) · (κQ + κR), Mξ = C · (Mζ,1 +Mζ,2) · J(K0, b0)2 · σ−2min(Q),
where C is a positive absolute constant, and κQ and κR are condition numbers of Q and R,
respectively.
We summarize the primal-dual gradient temporal difference algorithm in Algorithm 3.
Hereafter, for notational convenience, we denote by ψ̂t the estimated feature vector ψ̂(xt, ut).
We now characterize the rate of convergence of Algorithm 3.
Theorem B.8 (Convergence of Algorithm 3). Given K0, b0, K, and b such that ρ(A −
BK0) < 1 and J(K, b) ≤ J(K0, b0), we define the sets Vζ and Vξ through Definition B.7.
Let γt = γ0t
−1/2, where γ0 is a positive absolute constant. Let ρ ∈ (ρ(A − BK), 1). For
T˜ ≥ poly0(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · (1 − ρ)−6 and a sufficiently large T , it holds with
probability at least 1− T−4 − T˜−6 that
‖α̂K,b − αK,b‖22 ≤ λ−2K · poly1
(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · [ log6 T
T 1/2 · (1− ρ)4 +
log T˜
T˜ 1/4 · (1− ρ)2
]
,
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Algorithm 3 Primal-Dual Gradient Temporal Difference Algorithm.
1: Input: Policy πK,b, mean-field state µ, numbers of iteration T˜ and T , stepsizes {γt}t∈[T ],
parameters K0 and b0.
2: Define the sets Vζ and Vξ via Definition B.7 with K0 and b0.
3: Initialize the parameters by ζ0 ∈ Vζ and ξ0 ∈ Vξ.
4: Sample x˜0 from the the stationary distribution N (µK,b,ΦK).
5: for t = 0, . . . , T˜ − 1 do
6: Given the mean-field state µ, take action u˜t following πK,b and generate the next state
x˜t+1.
7: end for
8: Set µ̂K,b ← 1/T˜ ·
∑T˜
t=1 x˜t and compute the estimated feature vector ψ̂ via (B.14).
9: Sample x0 from the the stationary distribution N (µK,b,ΦK).
10: for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
11: Given the mean-field state µ, take action ut following πK,b, observe the cost ct, and
generate the next state xt+1.
12: Set δt+1 ← ζ1t + (ψ̂t − ψ̂t+1)⊤ζ2t − ct.
13: Update parameters via
ζ1t+1 ← ζ1t − γt+1 · (ξ1t + ψ̂⊤t ξ2t ), ζ2t+1 ← ζ2t − γt+1 · ψ̂t(ψ̂t − ψ̂t+1)⊤ξ2t ,
ξ1t+1 ← (1− γt+1) · ξ1t + γt+1 · (ζ1t − ct), ξ2t+1 ← (1− γt+1) · ξ2t + γt+1 · δt+1 · ψ̂t.
14: Project ζt+1 and ξt+1 to Vζ and Vξ, respectively.
15: end for
16: Set α̂K,b ← (
∑T
t=1 γt)
−1 · (∑Tt=1 γt · ζ2t ), and
Υ̂K ← smat(α̂K,b,1),
(
p̂K,b
q̂K,b
)
← α̂K,b,2 − Υ̂K
(
µ̂K,b
−Kµ̂K,b + b
)
,
where α̂K,b,1 = (α̂K,b)
(k+d+1)(k+d)/2
1 and α̂K,b,2 = (α̂K,b)
(k+d+3)(k+d)/2
(k+d+1)(k+d)/2+1.
17: Output: Estimators µ̂K,b, Υ̂K , and q̂K,b.
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where λK is defined in Proposition B.6. Same bounds for ‖Υ̂K −ΥK‖2F, ‖p̂K,b − pK,b‖22, and
‖q̂K,b − qK,b‖22 hold. Meanwhile, it holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6 that
‖µ̂K,b − µK,b‖2 ≤ log T˜
T˜ 1/4
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly2
(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)).
Proof. See §D.3 for a detailed proof.
B.3 Temporal Difference Policy Evaluation Algorithm
Besides the primal-dual gradient temporal difference algorithm, we can also evaluate αK,b
by TD(0) method (Sutton and Barto, 2018) in practice, which is presented in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Temporal Difference Policy Evaluation Algorithm.
1: Input: Policy πK,b, number of iteration T˜ and T , stepsizes {γt}t∈[T ].
2: Sample x˜0 from the stationary distribution N (µK,b,ΦK).
3: for t = 0, . . . , T˜ − 1 do
4: Take action u˜t under the policy πK,b and generate the next state x˜t+1.
5: end for
6: Set µ̂K,b ← 1/T˜ ·
∑T˜
t=1 x˜t.
7: Sample x0 from the the stationary distribution N (µK,b,ΦK).
8: for t = 0, . . . , T do
9: Given the mean-field state µ, take action ut following πK,b, observe the cost ct, and
generate the next state xt+1.
10: Set δt+1 ← ζ1t + (ψ̂t − ψ̂t+1)⊤ζ2t − ct.
11: Update parameters via ζ1t+1 ← (1− γt+1) · ζ1t + γt+1 · ct and ζ2t+1 ← ζ2t − γt+1 · δt+1 · ψ̂t.
12: Project ζt to V ′ζ , where V ′ζ is a compact set.
13: end for
14: Set α̂K,b ← (
∑T
t=1 γt)
−1 · (∑Tt=1 γt · ζ2t ), and
Υ̂K ← smat(α̂K,b,1),
(
p̂K,b
q̂K,b
)
← α̂K,b,2 − Υ̂K
(
µ̂K,b
−Kµ̂K,b + b
)
,
where α̂K,b,1 = (α̂K,b)
(k+d+1)(k+d)/2
1 and α̂K,b,2 = (α̂K,b)
(k+d+3)(k+d)/2
(k+d+1)(k+d)/2+1.
15: Output: Estimators µ̂K,b, Υ̂K , and q̂K,b.
Note that in related literature (Bhandari et al., 2018; Korda and La, 2015), non-asymptotic
convergence analysis of TD(0) method with linear function approximation is only applied
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to discounted MDP. As for our ergodic setting, the convergence of TD(0) method is only
shown asymptotically (Borkar and Meyn, 2000; Kushner and Yin, 2003) using ordinary dif-
ferential equation method. Therefore, in the convergence theorem proposed in §3, we only
focus on the primal-dual gradient temporal difference method (Algorithm 3) to establish
non-asymptotic convergence result.
C General Formulation
In this section, we study a general formulation of LQ-MFG. Compared with Problem 2.1,
such a general formulation includes an additional term x⊤t PEx
∗
t in the cost function. We
define the general formulation as follows.
Problem C.1 (General LQ-MFG). We consider the following formulation,
xt+1 = Axt +But + AEx
∗
t + d+ ωt,
c˜(xt, ut) = x
⊤
t Qxt + u
⊤
t Rut + (Ex
∗
t )
⊤Q(Ex∗t ) + 2x
⊤
t P (Ex
∗
t ),
J˜(π) = lim
T→∞
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=0
c˜(xt, ut)
]
,
where xt ∈ Rm is the state vector, ut ∈ Rk is the action vector generated by the policy π,
{x∗t}t≥0 is the trajectory generated by a Nash policy π∗ (assuming it exists), ωt ∈ Rm is an
independent random noise term following the Gaussian distribution N (0,Ψω), and d ∈ Rm
is a drift term. Here the expectation in Ex∗t is taken across all the agents. We aim to find
π∗ such that J˜(π∗) = infπ∈Π J˜(π).
Following similar analysis in §2, it suffices to study Problem C.1 with t sufficiently large,
which motivates us to formulate the following general drifted LQR (general D-LQR) problem.
Problem C.2 (General D-LQR). Given a mean-field state µ ∈ Rm, we consider the following
formulation,
xt+1 = Axt +But + Aµ+ d+ ωt,
c˜µ(xt, ut) = x
⊤
t Qxt + u
⊤
t Rut + µ
⊤Qµ+ 2x⊤t Pµ,
J˜µ(π) = lim
T→∞
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=0
c˜µ(xt, ut)
]
,
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where xt ∈ Rm is the state vector, ut ∈ Rk is the action vector generated by the policy π, ωt ∈
R
m is an independent random noise term following the Gaussian distribution N (0,Ψω), and
d ∈ Rm is a drift term. We aim to find an optimal policy π∗µ such that J˜µ(π∗µ) = infπ∈Π J˜µ(π).
In Problem C.2, the unique optimal policy π∗µ admits a linear form π
∗
µ(xt) = −Kπ∗µxt+bπ∗µ
(Anderson and Moore, 2007), where the matrix Kπ∗µ ∈ Rk×m and the vector bπ∗µ ∈ Rk are
the parameters of the policy π. It then suffices to find the optimal policy in the class Π
introduced in (2.1). Similar to §3.3, we drop the subscript µ when we focus on Problem C.2
for a fixed µ. We write πK,b(x) = −Kx + b + ση to emphasize the dependence on K and
b, and J˜(K, b) = J˜(πK,b) consequently. We derive a close form of the expected total cost
J˜(K, b) in the following proposition.
Proposition C.3. The expected total cost J˜(K, b) in Problem C.2 is decomposed as
J˜(K, b) = J˜1(K) + J˜2(K, b) + σ
2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ,
where J˜1(K) and J˜2(K, b) take the forms of
J˜1(K) = tr
[
(Q +K⊤RK)ΦK
]
= tr(PKΨǫ),
J˜2(K, b) =
(
µK,b
b
)⊤(
Q+K⊤RK −K⊤R
−RK R
)(
µK,b
b
)
+ 2µ⊤PµK,b.
Here µK,b is defined in (3.2), ΦK is defined in (3.3), and PK is defined in (3.4).
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition B.2. Thus we omit it here.
Compared with the form of J(K, b) in (3.5), the form of J˜(K, b) contains an additional
term 2µ⊤PµK,b in J˜2(K, b). Recall that µK,b is linear in b by (3.2). Therefore, 2µ
⊤PµK,b is
linear in b, which shows that J˜2(K, b) is still strongly convex in b. The following proposition
formally characterize the strong convexity of J˜2(K, b) in b.
Proposition C.4. Given any K, the function J˜2(K, b) is νK-strongly convex in b, here
νK = σmin(Y
⊤
1,KY1,K + Y
⊤
2,KY2,K), where Y1,K = R
1/2K(I − A + BK)−1B − R1/2 and Y2,K =
Q1/2(I − A + BK)−1B. Also, J˜2(K, b) has ιK-Lipschitz continuous gradient in b, where
ιK ≤ [1− ρ(A−BK)]−2 · (‖B‖22 · ‖K‖22 · ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · ‖Q‖2).
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 3.3. Thus we omit it here.
We derive a similar proposition to Proposition 3.4 in the sequel.
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Proposition C.5. We define b˜K = argminb J˜2(K, b). It holds that
b˜K =
[
KQ−1(I −A)⊤ − R−1B⊤] · S · [(Aµ+ d) + (I − A)Q−1P⊤µ]−KQ−1P⊤µ.
Moreover, J˜2(K, b
K) takes the form of
J˜2(K, b˜
K) =
(
Aµ+ d
P⊤µ
)⊤(
S S(I −A)Q−1
Q−1(I − A)⊤S 3Q−1(I − A)⊤S(I − A)Q−1 −Q−1
)(
Aµ+ d
P⊤µ
)
,
which is independent of K. Here S = [(I − A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 3.4. Thus we omit it here.
Similar to Problem 2.2, we define the state- and action-value functions as
V˜K,b(x) =
∞∑
t=0
{
E
[
c˜(xt, ut) | x0 = x
]− J˜(K, b)},
Q˜K,b(x, u) = c˜(x, u)− J˜(K, b) + E
[
V˜K,b(x1) | x0 = x, u0 = u
]
,
where xt follows the state transition, and ut follows the policy πK,b given xt. In other words,
we have ut = −Kxt + b+ σηt, where ηt ∼ N (0, I). Similar to Proposition B.1, the following
proposition establishes the close forms of these value functions.
Proposition C.6. The state-value function V˜K,b(x) takes the form of
V˜K,b(x) = x
⊤PKx− tr(PKΦK) + 2f˜⊤K,b(x− µK,b)− µ⊤K,bPKµK,b,
and the action-value function Q˜K,b(x, u) takes the form of
Q˜K,b(x, u) =
(
x
u
)⊤
ΥK
(
x
u
)
+ 2
(
p˜K,b
q˜K,b
)⊤(
x
u
)
− tr(PKΦK)− σ2 · tr(R + PKBB⊤)− b⊤Rb
+ 2b⊤RKµK,b − µ⊤K,b(Q+K⊤RK + PK)µK,b + 2f˜⊤K,b
[
(Aµ+ d)− µK,b
]
+ (Aµ+ d)⊤PK(Aµ+ d)− 2µ⊤PµK,b.
Here ΥK is defined in (3.7), and p˜K,b, q˜K,b are defined as
p˜K,b = A
⊤
[
PK · (Aµ+ d) + f˜K,b
]
+ Pµ, q˜K,b = B
⊤
[
PK · (Aµ+ d) + f˜K,b
]
, (C.1)
where f˜K,b = (I − A+BK)−⊤[(A−BK)⊤PK(Bb+ Aµ+ d)−K⊤Rb+ Pµ].
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition B.1. Thus we omit it here.
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The following proposition establishes the gradients of J˜1(K) and J˜2(K, b), respectively.
Proposition C.7. The gradient of J˜1(K) and the gradient of J˜2(K, b) with respect to b
take the forms of
∇K J˜1(K) = 2(Υ22KK −Υ21K ) · ΦK , ∇bJ˜2(K, b) = 2
[
Υ22K (−KµK,b + b) + Υ21KµK,b + q˜K,b
]
,
where ΥK and q˜K,b are defined in (3.7) and (C.1), respectively.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition B.3. Thus we omit it here.
Equipped with above results, parallel to the analysis in §3, it is clear that by slight
modification of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3, we derive similar actor-critic algorithms to solve
both Problem C.1 and Problem C.2, where all the non-asymptotic convergence results hold.
We omit the algorithms and the convergence results here.
D Proofs of Theorems
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We define µ∗s+1 = Λ(µs), which is the mean-field state generated by the optimal policy
πK∗(µs),b∗(µs) = Λ1(µs) under the current mean-field state µs. By Proposition 3.4, the optimal
K∗(µ) is independent of the mean-field state µ. Therefore, we write K∗ = K∗(µ) hereafter
for notational convenience. By (3.2), we know that
µ∗s+1 = (I − A+BK∗)−1 ·
[
Bb∗(µs) + Aµs + d
]
.
We define
µ˜s+1 = (I − A+BKs)−1(Bbs + Aµs + d),
which is the mean-field state generated by the policy πs under the current mean-field state
µs, where Ks and bs are the parameters of the policy πs. By triangle inequality, we have
‖µs+1 − µ∗‖2 ≤ ‖µs+1 − µ˜s+1‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
E1
+ ‖µ˜s+1 − µ∗s+1‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
E2
+ ‖µ∗s+1 − µ∗‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
E3
, (D.1)
where µs+1 is generated by Algorithm 1. We upper bound E1, E2, and E3 in the sequel.
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Upper Bound of E1. By Theorem B.4, it holds with probability at least 1− ε10 that
E1 = ‖µs+1 − µ˜s+1‖2 < εs ≤ ε/8 · 2−s, (D.2)
where εs is given in (4.2).
Upper Bound of E2. By the triangle inequality, we have
E2 =
∥∥∥(I − A+BKs)−1(Bbs + Aµs + d)− (I −A+BK∗)−1 · [Bb∗(µs) + Aµs + d]∥∥∥
2
≤ ∥∥Bb∗(µs) + Aµs + d∥∥2 · ∥∥∥[I − A+BK∗ +B(Ks −K∗)]−1 − (I −A+BK∗)−1∥∥∥2
+
∥∥(I − A+BKs)−1∥∥2 · ‖B‖2 · ∥∥bs − b∗(µs)∥∥2. (D.3)
By Taylor’s expansion, we have∥∥∥[I − A+BK∗ +B(Ks −K∗)]−1 − (I −A +BK∗)−1∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥(I − A+BK∗)−1[I + (I − A+BK∗)−1B(Ks −K∗)]−1 − (I − A+BK∗)−1∥∥∥
2
≤ 2∥∥(I − A+BK∗)−1B(Ks −K∗)(I − A+BK∗)−1∥∥2. (D.4)
Meanwhile, by Taylor’s expansion, it holds with probability at least 1− ε10 that∥∥(I − A+BKs)−1∥∥2 = ∥∥∥(I − A+BK∗ +B(Ks −K∗))−1∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥(I −A +BK∗)−1(I + (I − A+BK∗)−1B(Ks −K∗))−1∥∥∥
2
≤ [1− ρ(A−BK∗)]−1 · (1 + ∥∥(I − A+BK∗)−1B∥∥
2
· ‖K∗ −Ks‖2
)
≤ 2[1− ρ(A− BK∗)]−2, (D.5)
where the last inequality comes from Theorem B.4. By plugging (D.4) and (D.5) in (D.3),
it holds with probability at least 1− ε10 that
E2 ≤ 2
∥∥Bb∗(µs) + Aµs + d∥∥2 · ∥∥(I − A+BK∗)−1B(Ks −K∗)(I − A+BK∗)−1∥∥2
+
∥∥(I − A+BKs)−1∥∥2 · ‖B‖2 · ∥∥bs − b∗(µs)∥∥2
≤ 2∥∥Bb∗(µs) + Aµs + d∥∥2 · [1− ρ(A−BK∗)]−2 · ‖B‖2 · ‖Ks −K∗‖2 (D.6)
+ 2
[
1− ρ(A− BK∗)]−2 · ‖B‖2 · ∥∥bs − b∗(µs)∥∥2.
By Proposition 3.4, it holds that∥∥Bb∗(µs) + Aµs + d∥∥2 ≤ L1 · ‖B‖2 · ‖µs‖2 + ‖A‖2 · ‖µs‖2 + ‖d‖2
≤ (L1 · ‖B‖2 + ‖A‖2) · ‖µs‖2 + ‖d‖2, (D.7)
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where the scalar L1 is defined in Assumption 3.1. Meanwhile, by Theorem B.4, it holds with
probability at least 1− ε10 that
‖Ks −K∗‖F ≤
[
σ−1min(Ψǫ) · σ−1min(R) · εs
]1/2
,
∥∥bs − b∗(µs)∥∥2 ≤Mb(µs) · ε1/2s , (D.8)
where Mb(µs) is defined in (4.3). Combining (D.6), (D.7), (D.8), and the choice of εs in
(4.2), it holds with probability at least 1− ε10 that
E2 ≤ ε/8 · 2−s. (D.9)
Upper Bound of E3. By Proposition 3.2, we have
E3 = ‖µ∗s+1 − µ∗‖2 =
∥∥Λ(µs)− Λ(µ∗)∥∥2 ≤ L0 · ‖µs − µ∗‖2, (D.10)
where L0 = L1L3 + L2 by Assumption 3.1.
By plugging (D.2), (D.9), and (D.10) in (D.1), we know that
‖µs+1 − µ∗‖2 ≤ L0 · ‖µs − µ∗‖2 + ε · 2−s−2, (D.11)
which holds with probability at least 1 − ε10. Following from (D.11) and a union bound
argument with S = O(log(1/ε)), it holds with probability at least 1− ε5 that
‖µS − µ∗‖2 ≤ LS0 · ‖µ0 − µ∗‖2 + ε/2,
where we use the fact that L0 < 1 by Assumption 3.1. By the choice of S in (4.1), it further
holds with probability at least 1− ε6 that
‖µS − µ∗‖ ≤ ε. (D.12)
By Theorem B.4 and the choice of εs in (4.2), it holds with probability at least 1 − ε5
that
‖KS −K∗‖F =
∥∥KS −K∗(µS)∥∥F ≤ [σ−1min(Ψǫ) · σ−1min(R) · εS]1/2 ≤ ε. (D.13)
Meanwhile, by the triangle inequality and the choice of εs in (4.2), it holds with probability
at least 1− ε5 that
‖bS − b∗‖2 ≤
∥∥bS − b∗(µS)∥∥2 + ∥∥b∗(µS)− b∗∥∥2
≤ Mb(µS) · ε1/2S + L1 · ‖µS − µ∗‖2
≤ (1 + L1) · ε, (D.14)
where the second inequality comes from Theorem B.4 and Proposition 3.4, and the last
inequality comes from (D.12). By (D.12), (D.13), and (D.14), we conclude the proof of the
theorem.
39
D.2 Proof of Theorem B.4
Proof. We first show that J1(KN) − J1(K∗) < ε/2 with a high probability, then show that
J2(KN , bH)− J2(K∗, b∗) < ε/2 with a high probability. Then we have
J(KN , bN )− J(K∗, b∗) = J1(KN) + J2(KN , bH)− J1(K∗)− J2(K∗, b∗) < ε
with a high probability, which proves Theorem B.4.
Part 1. We show that J1(KN)− J1(K∗) < ε/2 with a high probability.
We first bound J1(K1) − J1(K2) for any K1 and K2. By Proposition B.2, J1(K) takes
the form of
J1(K) = tr(PKΨǫ) = Ey∼N (0,Ψǫ)(y
⊤PKy). (D.15)
The following lemma calculates y⊤PK1y − y⊤PK2y for any K1 and K2.
Lemma D.1. Assume that ρ(A − BK1) < 1 and ρ(A − BK2) < 1. For any state vector
y, we denote by {yt}t≥0 the sequence generated by the state transition yt+1 = (A− BK2)yt
with initial state y0 = y. It holds that
y⊤PK2y − y⊤PK1y =
∑
t≥0
DK1,K2(yt),
where
DK1,K2(y) = 2y
⊤(K2 −K1)(Υ22K1K1 −Υ21K1)y + y⊤(K2 −K1)⊤Υ22K1(K2 −K1)y.
Here ΥK is defined in (3.7).
Proof. See §F.1 for a detailed proof.
The following lemma shows that J1(K) is gradient dominant.
Lemma D.2. LetK∗ be the optimal parameter andK be a parameter such that J1(K) <∞,
then it holds that
J1(K)− J1(K∗) ≤ σ−1min(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖2 · tr
[
(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )
]
, (D.16)
J1(K)− J1(K∗) ≥ σmin(Ψω) · ‖Υ22K‖−12 · tr
[
(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )
]
. (D.17)
Proof. See §F.2 for a detailed proof.
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Recall that from Algorithm 2, the parameter K is updated via
Kn+1 = Kn − γ · (Υ̂22KnKn − Υ̂21Kn), (D.18)
where Υ̂Kn is the output of Algorithm 3. We upper bound |J1(Kn+1)−J1(K∗)| in the sequel.
First, we show that if J1(Kn)− J1(K∗) ≥ ε/2 holds for any n ≤ N , we obtain that
J1(KN) ≤ J1(KN−1) ≤ · · · ≤ J1(K0), (D.19)
which holds with probability at least 1 − ε13. We prove (D.19) by mathematical induction.
Suppose that
J1(Kn) ≤ J1(Kn−1) ≤ · · · ≤ J1(K0), (D.20)
which holds for n = 0. In what follows, we define K˜n+1 as
K˜n+1 = Kn − γ · (Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn), (D.21)
where ΥKn is given in (3.7). By (D.21), we have
J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn) = Ey∼N (0,Ψǫ)
[
y⊤(PK˜n+1 − PKn)y
]
= −2γ · tr[ΦK˜n+1 · (Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)⊤(Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)]
+ γ2 · tr[ΦK˜n+1 · (Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)⊤Υ22Kn(Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)]
≤ −2γ · tr[ΦK˜n+1 · (Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)⊤(Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)] (D.22)
+ γ2 · ‖Υ22Kn‖2 · tr
[
ΦK˜n+1 · (Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)⊤(Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)
]
,
where the first equality comes from (D.15), the second equality comes from Lemma D.1, and
the last inequality comes from the trace inequality. By the definition of ΥK in (3.7), we
obtain that
‖Υ22Kn‖2 ≤ ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · ‖PKn‖2 ≤ ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · J1(Kn) · σ−1min(Ψǫ)
≤ ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · J1(K0) · σ−1min(Ψǫ), (D.23)
where the second inequality comes from Proposition B.2. By plugging (D.23) and the choice
of stepsize γ ≤ [‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · J1(K0) · σ−1min(Ψǫ)]−1 into (D.22), we obtain that
J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn) ≤ −γ · tr
[
ΦK˜n+1 · (Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)⊤(Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)
]
≤ −γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · tr
[
(Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)⊤(Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn)
]
≤ −γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖−12 ·
[
J1(Kn)− J1(K∗)
]
< 0, (D.24)
where the last inequality comes from Lemma D.2.
The following lemma upper bounds |J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn+1)|.
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Lemma D.3. Assume that J1(Kn) ≤ J1(K0). It holds with probability at least 1− ε15 that∣∣J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn+1)∣∣ ≤ γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖−12 · ε/4,
where Kn+1 and K˜n+1 are defined in (D.18) and (D.21), respectively.
Proof. See §F.3 for a detailed proof.
Combining (D.24) and Lemma D.3, if J1(Kn)− J1(K∗) ≥ ε/2, it holds with probability
at least 1− ε15 that
J1(Kn+1)− J1(Kn) ≤ J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn) +
∣∣J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn+1)∣∣
≤ −γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖−12 · ε/4 < 0. (D.25)
Combining (D.20) and (D.25), it holds with probability at least 1− ε15 that
J1(Kn+1) ≤ J1(Kn) ≤ · · · ≤ J1(K0).
Finally, following from a union bound argument and the choice of N in Theorem B.4, if
J1(Kn)− J1(K∗) ≥ ε/2 holds for any n ≤ N , we have
J1(KN) ≤ J1(KN−1) ≤ · · · ≤ J1(K0),
which holds with probability at least 1− ε13. Thus, we complete the proof of (D.19).
Combining (D.24) and (D.25), for J1(Kn)− J1(K∗) ≥ ε/2, we have
J1(Kn+1)− J1(K∗) ≤
[
1− γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖−12
] · [J1(Kn)− J1(K∗)],
which holds with probability at least 1 − ε13. Meanwhile, following from a union bound
argument and the choice of N in Theorem B.4, it holds with probability at least 1− ε11 that
J1(KN)− J1(K∗) ≤ ε/2. (D.26)
The following lemma upper bounds ‖KN −K∗‖F.
Lemma D.4. For any K, we have
‖K −K∗‖2F ≤ σ−1min(Ψǫ) · σ−1min(R) ·
[
J1(K)− J1(K∗)
]
.
Proof. See §F.4 for a detailed proof.
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Combining (D.26) and Lemma D.4, we have
‖KN −K∗‖F ≤
[
σ−1min(Ψǫ) · σ−1min(R) · ε/2
]1/2
, (D.27)
which holds with probability 1− ε11.
Part 2. We show that J2(KN , bH)− J2(K∗, b∗) < ε/2 with high probability. Following from
Proposition 3.4, it holds that J2(K
∗, b∗) = J2(KN , b
KN ). Therefore, it suffices to show that
J2(KN , bH)− J2(KN , bKN ) < ε/2.
First, we show that if J2(KN , bh)− J2(KN , bKN ) ≥ ε/2 for any h ≤ H , we obtain that
J2(KN , bH) ≤ J2(KN , bH−1) ≤ · · · ≤ J2(KN , b1) ≤ J2(KN , b0), (D.28)
which holds with probability at least 1 − ε13. We prove (D.28) by mathematical induction.
Suppose that
J2(KN , bh) ≤ J2(KN , bh−1) ≤ · · · ≤ J2(KN , b0), (D.29)
Recall that by Algorithm 2, the parameter b is updated via
bh+1 = bh − γb · ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh). (D.30)
Here
∇̂bJ2(KN , bh) = Υ̂22KN (−KN µ̂KN ,bh + bh) + Υ̂21KN µ̂KN ,bh + q̂KN ,bh, (D.31)
where Υ̂KN and q̂KN ,bh are the outputs of Algorithm 3. We define b˜h+1 as
b˜h+1 = bh − γb · ∇bJ2(KN , bh). (D.32)
Here
∇bJ2(KN , bh) = Υ22KN (−KNµKN ,bh + bh) + Υ21KNµKN ,bh + qKN ,bh, (D.33)
where ΥKN and qKN ,bh are defined in (3.7). We upper bound J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , bKN ) in
the sequel. Following from (D.32) and Proposition 3.3, we have
J2(KN , b˜h+1)− J2(KN , bh) ≤ −γb/2 ·
∥∥∇bJ2(KN , bh)∥∥22
≤ −νKN · γb ·
[
J2(KN , bh)− J2(KN , bKN )
]
≤ −νKN · γb · ε < 0, (D.34)
where νKN is specified in Proposition 3.3. The following lemma upper bounds |J2(KN , bh+1)−
J2(KN , b˜h+1)|.
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Lemma D.5. Assume that J2(KN , bh) ≤ J2(KN , b0). It holds with probability at least
1− ε15 that ∣∣J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , b˜h+1)∣∣ ≤ νKN · γb · ε/2,
where bh+1 and b˜h+1 are defined in (D.30) and (D.32), respectively.
Proof. See §F.5 for a detailed proof.
Combining (D.34) and Lemma D.5, we know that if J2(KN , bh) − J2(KN , bKN ) ≥ ε, it
holds with probability at least 1− ε15 that
J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , bh) ≤ J2(KN , b˜h+1)− J2(KN , bh) +
∣∣J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , b˜h+1)∣∣
≤ −νKN · γb · ε/2 < 0. (D.35)
Combining (D.29) and (D.35), it holds with probability at least 1− ε15 that
J2(KN , bh+1) ≤ J2(KN , bh) ≤ · · · ≤ J2(KN , b0).
Following from a union bound argument and the choice of H in Theorem B.4, if J2(KN , bh)−
J2(KN , b
KN ) ≥ ε holds for any h ≤ H , we have
J2(KN , bH) ≤ J2(KN , bH−1) ≤ · · · ≤ J2(KN , b0),
which holds with probability at least 1− ε13. Thus, we finish the proof of (D.28).
Combining (D.34) and Lemma D.5, for J2(KN , bh)− J2(KN , bKN ) ≥ ε/2, we have
J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , bKN ) ≤ (1− νKN · γb) ·
[
J2(KN , bh)− J2(KN , bKN )
]
,
which holds with probability at least 1 − ε13. Meanwhile, following from a union bound
argument and the choice of H in Theorem B.4, it holds with probability at least 1− ε11 that
J2(KN , bH)− J2(KN , bKN ) ≤ ε/2. (D.36)
By Proposition 3.3 and (D.36), it holds with probability at least 1− ε11 that
‖bH − bKN‖2 ≤ (2ε/νK∗)1/2. (D.37)
Following from Proposition 3.4, we know that
bKN − b∗ = (KN −K∗)Q−1(I −A)⊤ (D.38)
· [(I − A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1 · (Aµ+ d).
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Combining (D.27), (D.37), and (D.38), it holds with probability 1− ε10 that
‖bH − bKN‖2 ≤Mb · ε1/2,
where
Mb(µ) = 4
∥∥∥Q−1(I − A)⊤ · [(I − A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1 · (Aµ+ d)∥∥∥
2
· [ν−1K∗ + σ−1min(Ψǫ) · σ−1min(R)]1/2.
We finish the proof of the theorem.
D.3 Proof of Theorem B.8
Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Yang et al. (2019), where they only consider
LQR without drift terms. Since our proof requires much more delicate analysis, we present
it here.
Part 1. We denote by ζ̂ and ξ̂ the primal and dual variables generated by Algorithm 3. We
define the primal-dual gap of (B.11) as
gap(ζ̂ , ξ̂) = max
ξ∈Vξ
F (ζ̂ , ξ)−min
ζ∈Vζ
F (ζ, ξ̂). (D.39)
In the sequel, we upper bound ‖α̂K,b − αK,b‖2 using (D.39).
We define ζK,b and ξ(ζ) as
ζK,b =
(
J(K, b), α⊤K,b
)⊤
, ξ(ζ) = argmax
ξ
F (ζ, ξ). (D.40)
Following from (B.12), we know that
ξ1(ζ) = ζ1 − J(K, b), ξ2(ζ) = EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ζ1 +ΘK,bζ
2 − EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]
. (D.41)
The following lemma shows that ζK,b ∈ Vζ and ξ(ζ) ∈ Vξ for any ζ ∈ Vζ.
Lemma D.6. Under the assumptions in Theorem B.8, it holds that ζK,b = (J(K, b), α
⊤
K,b)
⊤ ∈
Vζ . Also, for any ζ ∈ Vζ, the vector ξ(ζ) defined in (D.40) satisfies that ξ(ζ) ∈ Vξ.
Proof. See §F.6 for a detailed proof.
45
By (B.12), we know that ∇ζF (ζK,b, 0) = 0 and ∇ξF (ζK,b, 0) = 0. Combining Lemma
D.6, it holds that (ζK,b, 0) is a saddle point of the function F (ζ, ξ) defined in (B.11).
Following from (D.39), it holds that∥∥∥EπK,b[ψ(x, u)]ζ̂1 +ΘK,bζ̂2 − EπK,b[c(x, u)ψ(x, u)]∥∥∥2
2
+
∣∣ζ̂1 − J(K, b)∣∣2
= F
(
ζ̂ , ξ(ζ̂)
)
= max
ξ∈Vξ
F (ζ̂, ξ) = gap(ζ̂ , ξ̂) + min
ζ∈Vζ
F (ζ, ξ̂), (D.42)
where the first equality comes from (D.41), and the second equality comes from the fact that
ξ(ζ̂) = argmaxξ∈Vξ F (ζ̂ , ξ) by (D.40) and Lemma D.6. We upper bound the RHS of (D.42)
and lower bound the LHS of (D.42) in the sequel.
As for the RHS of (D.42), it holds for any ξ ∈ Vξ that
min
ζ∈Vζ
F (ζ, ξ) ≤ min
ζ∈Vζ
max
ξ∈Vξ
F (ζ, ξ) = min
ζ∈Vζ
F
(
ζ, ξ(ζ)
)
=
1
2
min
ζ∈Vζ
{∥∥∥EπK,b[ψ(x, u)]ζ1 +ΘK,bζ2 − EπK,b[c(x, u)ψ(x, u)]∥∥∥2
2
+
∣∣ζ1 − J(K, b)∣∣2}
= 0, (D.43)
where the first equality comes from the fact that ξ(ζ) = argmaxξ∈Vξ F (ζ, ξ) by (D.40) and
Lemma D.6, the second equality comes from (D.41), and the last equality holds by taking
ζ = ζK,b ∈ Vζ . Meanwhile, we lower bound the LHS of (D.42) as∥∥∥EπK,b[ψ(x, u)]ζ̂1 +ΘK,bζ̂2 − EπK,b[c(x, u)ψ(x, u)]∥∥∥2
2
+
∣∣ζ̂1 − J(K, b)∣∣2
=
∥∥Θ˜K,b(ζ̂ − ζK,b)∥∥22 ≥ λ2K · ‖ζ̂ − ζK,b‖22 ≥ λ2K · ‖α̂K,b − αK,b‖22, (D.44)
where the first equality comes from the definition of Θ˜K,b in (B.9), and the first inequality
comes from Proposition B.6. Here λK is defined in Proposition B.6. Combining (D.42),
(D.43), and (D.44), it holds that
‖α̂K,b − αK,b‖22 ≤ λ−2K · gap(ζ̂ , ξ̂), (D.45)
which finishes the proof of this part.
Part 2. We now upper bound gap(ζ̂ , ξ̂). We denote by z˜t = (x˜
⊤
t , u˜
⊤
t )
⊤ for t ∈ [T˜ ], where
x˜t and u˜t are generated in Line 6 of Algorithm 3. Following from the state transition in
Problem 2.1 and the form of the linear policy, {z˜t}t∈[T˜ ] follows the following transition,
z˜t+1 = Lz˜t + ν + δt, (D.46)
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where
ν =
(
Aµ+ d
−K(Aµ+ d) + b
)
, δt =
(
ωt
−Kωt + ση
)
, L =
(
A B
−KA −KB
)
.
Note that we have
L =
(
A B
−KA −KB
)
=
(
I
−K
)(
A B
)
.
Then by the property of spectral radius, it holds that
ρ(L) = ρ
((
A B
)( I
−K
))
= ρ(A− BK) < 1.
Thus, the Markov chain generated by (D.46) admits a unique stationary distributionN (µz,Σz),
where
µz = (I − L)−1ν, Σz = LΣzL⊤ +
(
Ψω −ΨωK⊤
−KΨω KΨωK⊤ + σ2I
)
. (D.47)
The following lemma characterizes the average
µ̂z = 1/T˜ ·
T˜∑
t=1
z˜t. (D.48)
Lemma D.7. It holds that
µ̂z ∼ N
(
µz +
1
T˜
µT˜ ,
1
T˜
Σ˜T˜
)
,
where ‖µT˜‖2 ≤Mµ · (1− ρ)−2 · ‖µz‖2 and ‖Σ˜T˜‖F ≤MΣ · (1− ρ)−1 · ‖Σz‖F. Here Mµ and MΣ
are positive absolute constants. Moreover, it holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6 that
‖µ̂z − µz‖2 ≤ log T˜
T˜ 1/4
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2).
Proof. See §F.7 for a detailed proof.
Lemma D.7 gives that
‖µ̂K,b − µK,b‖2 ≤ log T˜
T˜ 1/4
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2),
which holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6.
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We now apply a truncation argument to show that gap(ζ̂ , ξ̂) is upper bounded. We define
the event E in the sequel. Following from Lemma D.7, it holds for any z ∼ N (µz,Σz) that
z − µ̂z + 1/T˜ · µT˜ ∼ N (0,Σz + 1/T˜ · Σ˜T˜ ).
By Lemma G.3, there exists a positive absolute constant C0 such that
P
[∣∣‖z − µ̂z + 1/T˜ · µT˜‖22 − tr(Σ˜z)∣∣ > τ] ≤ 2 exp[−C0 ·min(τ 2‖Σ˜z‖−2F , τ‖Σ˜z‖−12 )], (D.49)
where we write Σ˜z = Σz+1/T˜ ·Σ˜T˜ for notational convenience. By taking τ = C1 ·log T ·‖Σ˜z‖F
in (D.49) for a sufficiently large positive absolute constant C1, it holds that
P
[∣∣‖z − µ̂z + 1/T˜ · µT˜‖22 − tr(Σ˜z)∣∣ > C1 · log T · ‖Σ˜z‖F] ≤ T−6. (D.50)
We define the event Et,1 for any t ∈ [T ] as
Et,1 =
{∣∣‖zt − µ̂z + 1/T˜ · µT˜‖22 − tr(Σ˜z)∣∣ ≤ C1 · log T · ‖Σ˜z‖F}.
Then by (D.50), it holds for any t ∈ [T ] that
P(Et,1) ≥ 1− T−6. (D.51)
Also, we define
E1 =
⋂
t∈[T ]
Et,1. (D.52)
Following from a union bound argument and (D.51), it holds that
P(E1) ≥ 1− T−5. (D.53)
Also, conditioning on E1, it holds for sufficiently large T˜ that
max
t∈[T ]
‖zt − µ̂z‖22
≤ C1 · log T · ‖Σ˜z‖F + tr(Σ˜z) + ‖1/T˜ · µT˜‖22
≤ 2C˜1 ·
[
1 +MΣ(1− ρ)−1/T˜ 2
] · log T · ‖Σz‖2 +Mµ(1− ρ)−2/T˜ 2 · ‖µz‖22
≤ C2 · log T ·
(
1 + ‖K‖2F
) · ‖ΦK‖2 · (1− ρ)−1 + C3 · (‖b‖22 + ‖µ‖22) · (1− ρ)−4 · T˜−2
≤ 2C2 · log T ·
(
1 + ‖K‖2F
) · ‖ΦK‖2 · (1− ρ)−1, (D.54)
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where C˜1, C2, and C3 are positive absolute constants. Here, the first inequality comes from
the definition of E1 in (D.52), the second inequality comes from Lemma D.7, and the third
inequality comes from (D.47). Also, we define the following event
E2 =
{‖µ̂z − µz + 1/T˜ · µT˜‖2 ≤ C1}. (D.55)
Then by Lemma D.7, we know that
P(E2) ≥ 1− T˜−6 (D.56)
for T˜ sufficiently large. We define the event E as
E = E1
⋂
E2.
Then following from (D.53), (D.56), and a union bound argument, we know that
P(E) ≥ 1− T−5 − T˜−6.
Now, we define the truncated feature vector ψ˜(x, u) as ψ˜(x, u) = ψ̂(x, u)1E , the truncated
cost function c˜(x, u) as c˜(x, u) = c(x, u)1E , and also the truncated objective function F˜ (ζ, ξ)
as
F˜ (ζ, ξ) =
{
E(ψ˜)ζ1 + E
[
(ψ˜ − ψ˜′)ψ˜⊤]ζ2 − E(c˜ψ˜)}⊤ξ2 + [ζ1 − E(c˜)] · ξ1 − ‖ξ‖22/2, (D.57)
where we write ψ˜ = ψ˜(x, u) and c˜ = c˜(x, u) for notational convenience. Here the expectation
is taken following the policy πK,b and the state transition. The following lemma establishes
the upper bound of |F (ζ, ξ)− F˜ (ζ, ξ)|, where F (ζ, ξ) and F˜ (ζ, ξ) are defined in (B.11) and
(D.57), respectively.
Lemma D.8. It holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6 that
∣∣F (ζ, ξ)− F˜ (ζ, ξ)∣∣ ≤ ( 1
2T
+
log T˜
T˜ 1/4
)
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)).
Proof. See §F.8 for a detailed proof.
Following from (D.39) and Lemma D.8, it holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6 that∣∣gap(ζ̂ , ξ̂)− g˜ap(ζ̂ , ξ̂)∣∣
≤
(
1
2T
+
log T˜
T˜ 1/4
)
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)). (D.58)
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where we define g˜ap(ζ̂ , ξ̂) as
g˜ap(ζ̂ , ξ̂) = max
ξ∈Vξ
F˜ (ζ̂ , ξ)−min
ζ∈Vζ
F˜ (ζ, ξ̂).
Therefore, to upper bound of gap(ζ, ξ), we only need to upper bound g˜ap(ζ, ξ).
Part 3. We upper bound g˜ap(ζ, ξ) in the sequel. We first show that the trajectory generated
by the policy πK,b and the state transition in Problem 2.2 is β-mixing.
Lemma D.9. Consider a linear system yt+1 = Dyt+ϑ+υt, where {yt}t≥0 ⊂ Rm, the matrix
D ∈ Rm×m satisfying ρ(D) < 1, the vector ϑ ∈ Rm, and υt ∼ N (0,Σ) is the Gaussians.
We denote by ̟t the marginal distribution of yt for any t ≥ 0. Meanwhile, assume that the
stationary distribution of {yt}t≥0 is a Gaussian distribution N ((I −D)−1ϑ,Σ∞), where Σ∞
is the covariance matrix. We define the β-mixing coefficients for any n ≥ 1 as follows
β(n) = sup
t≥0
Ey∼̟t
[∥∥Pyn(· | y0 = y)− PN ((I−D)−1ϑ,Σ∞)(·)∥∥TV].
Then, for any ρ ∈ (ρ(D), 1), the β-mixing coefficients satisfy that
β(n) ≤ Cρ,D,ϑ ·
[
tr(Σ∞) +m · (1− ρ)−2
]1/2 · ρn,
where Cρ,D,ϑ is a constant, which only depends on ρ, D, and ϑ. We say that the sequence
{yt}t≥0 is β-mixing with parameter ρ.
Proof. See Proposition 3.1 in Tu and Recht (2017) for details.
Recall that by (3.1), the sequence {xt}t≥0 follows
xt+1 = (A− BK)xt + (Bb+ Aµ+ d) + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N (0,Ψǫ),
where the matrix A − BK satisfies that ρ(A − BK) < 1. Therefore, by Lemma D.9, the
sequence {zt}t≥0 is β-mixing with parameter ρ ∈ (ρ(A−BK), 1), where zt = (x⊤t , u⊤t )⊤. The
following lemma upper bounds the primal-dual gap for a convex-concave problem.
Lemma D.10. Let X and Y be two compact and convex sets such that ‖x−x′‖2 ≤M and
‖y − y′‖2 ≤ M for any x, x′ ∈ X and y, y′ ∈ Y . We consider solving the following minimax
problem
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
H(x, y) = Eǫ∼̟ǫ
[
G(x, y; ǫ)
]
,
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where the objective function H(x, y) is convex in x and concave in y. In addition, we assume
that the distribution ̟ǫ is β-mixing with β(n) ≤ Cǫ ·ρn, where Cǫ is a constant. Meanwhile,
we assume that it holds almost surely that G(x, y; ǫ) is L˜0-Lipschitz in both x and y, the
gradient ∇xG(x, y; ǫ) is L˜1-Lipschitz in x for any y ∈ Y , the gradient ∇yG(x, y; ǫ) is L˜1-
Lipschitz in y for any x ∈ X , where Cǫ, L˜0, L˜1 > 1. Each step of our gradient-based method
takes the following forms,
xt+1 = ΓX
[
xt − γt+1 · ∇xG(xt, yt; ǫt)
]
, yt+1 = ΓY
[
yt − γt+1 · ∇yG(xt, yt; ǫt)
]
,
where the operators ΓX and ΓY projects the variables back to X and Y , respectively,
and the stepsizes take the form γt = γ0 · t−1/2 for a constant γ0 > 0. Moreover, let
x̂ = (
∑T
t=1 γt)
−1(
∑T
t=1 γtxt) and ŷ = (
∑T
t=1 γt)
−1(
∑T
t=1 γtyt) be the final output of the gra-
dient method after T iterations, then there exists a positive absolute constant C, such that
for any δ ∈ (0, 1), the primal-dual gap to the minimax problem is upper bounded as
max
x∈X
H(x̂, y)−min
y∈Y
H(x, ŷ) ≤ C · (M
2 + L˜20 + L˜0L˜1M)
log(1/ρ)
· log
2 T + log(1/δ)√
T
+
C · CǫL˜0M
T
,
which holds with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. See Theorem 5.4 in Yang et al. (2019) for details.
To use Lemma D.10, we define the function G(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) as
G(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) =
[
ψ˜ζ1 + (ψ˜ − ψ˜′)ψ˜⊤ζ2 − c˜ψ˜]⊤ξ2 + (ζ1 − c˜) · ξ1 − 1/2 · ‖ξ‖22,
where ψ˜ = ψ˜(x, u) and ψ˜′ = ψ˜(x′, u′). Note that the gradients of G(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) take the form
∇ζG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) =
(
ψ˜⊤ξ2 + ξ1
ψ˜(ψ˜ − ψ˜′)⊤ξ2
)
, ∇ξG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) =
(
ζ1 − c˜− ξ1
ψ˜ζ1 + (ψ˜ − ψ˜′)ψ˜⊤ζ2 − c˜ψ˜ − ξ2
)
.
By Definition B.7 and Lemma D.6, we know that∥∥∇ζG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′)∥∥2 ≤ poly(‖K‖F, J(K0, b0)) · log2 T · (1− ρ)−2,∥∥∇ξG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′)∥∥2 ≤ poly(‖K‖F, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · log2 T · (1− ρ)−2. (D.59)
This gives the Lipschitz constant L˜0 in Lemma D.10 for G(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜
′). Also, the Hessians of
G(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) take the forms of
∇2ζζG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) = 0, ∇2ξξG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) = −I,
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which follows that∥∥∇2ζζG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′)∥∥2 = 0, ∥∥∇2ξξG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′)∥∥2 = 1. (D.60)
This gives the Lipschitz constant L˜1 in Lemma D.10 for ∇ζG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′) and ∇ξG(ζ, ξ; ψ˜, ψ˜′).
Moreover, note that (D.54) provides an upper bound of M , combining (D.59), (D.60) and
Lemma D.10, it holds with probability at least 1− T−5 that
g˜ap(ζ̂ , ξ̂) ≤ poly
(‖K‖F, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · log6 T
(1− ρ)4 · √T . (D.61)
Combining (D.45), (D.58), and (D.61), we know that
‖α̂K,b − αK,b‖22 ≤ λ−2K · poly1
(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · [ log6 T
T 1/2 · (1− ρ)4 +
log T˜
T˜ 1/4 · (1− ρ)2
]
.
Same bounds for ‖Υ̂K − ΥK‖2F, ‖p̂K,b − pK,b‖22, and ‖q̂K,b − qK,b‖22 hold. We finish the proof
of the theorem.
E Proofs of Propositions
E.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. We follow a similar proof as in the one of Theorem 1.1 in Sznitman (1991) and
Theorem 3.2 in Bensoussan et al. (2016). Note that for any policy πK,b ∈ Π, the parameters
K and b uniquely determine the policy. We define the following metric on Π.
Definition E.1. For any πK1,b1 , πK2,b2 ∈ Π, we define the following metric,
‖πK1,b1 − πK2,b2‖2 = c1 · ‖K1 −K2‖2 + c2 · ‖b1 − b2‖2,
where c1 and c2 are positive constants.
One can verify that Definition E.1 satisfies the requirement of being a metric. We first
evaluate the forms of the operators Λ1(·) and Λ2(·, ·).
Forms of the operators Λ1(·) and Λ2(·, ·). By the definition of Λ1(µ), which gives the
optimal policy under the mean-field state µ, it holds that
Λ1(µ) = π
∗
µ,
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where π∗µ solves Problem 2.2. This gives the form of Λ1(·). We now turn to Λ2(µ, π), which
gives the mean-field state µnew generated by the policy π under the current mean-field state
µ. In Problem 2.2, the sequence of states {xt}t≥0 constitutes a Markov chain, which admits
a unique stationary distribution. Thus, by the state transition in Problem 2.2 and the form
of the linear-Gaussian policy, we have
µnew = (A− BKπ)µnew + (Bbπ + Aµ+ d), (E.1)
where Kπ and bπ are parameters of the policy π. By solving (E.1) for µnew, it holds that
Λ2(µ, π) = µnew = (I − A+BKπ)−1(Bbπ + Aµ+ d).
This gives the form of Λ2(·, ·).
Next, we compute the Lipschitz constants for Λ1(·) and Λ2(·, ·).
Lipschitz constant for Λ1(·). By Proposition 3.4, for any µ1, µ2 ∈ Rm, the optimal K∗ is
fixed for Problem 2.2. Therefore, by the form of the optimal bK given in Proposition 3.4, it
holds that ∥∥Λ1(µ1)− Λ1(µ2)∥∥2 ≤ c2 · ∥∥∥[(I − A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1A∥∥∥2
·
∥∥∥[K∗Q−1(I − A)⊤ −R−1B⊤]∥∥∥
2
· ‖µ1 − µ2‖2
= c2L1 · ‖µ1 − µ2‖2, (E.2)
where L1 is defined in Assumption 3.1.
Lipschitz constants for Λ2(·, ·). By Proposition 3.4, for any µ1, µ2 ∈ Rm, the optimal K∗
is fixed for Problem 2.2. Thus, for any π ∈ Π such that π is an optimal policy under some
µ ∈ Rm, it holds that∥∥Λ2(µ1, π)− Λ2(µ2, π)∥∥2 = ∥∥(I − A+BKπ)−1 · A · (µ1 − µ2)∥∥2
≤ [1− ρ(A− BK∗)]−1 · ‖A‖2 · ‖µ1 − µ2‖2
= L2 · ‖µ1 − µ2‖2, (E.3)
where L2 is defined in Assumption 3.1, and Kπ = K
∗ is the parameter of the policy π.
Meanwhile, for any mean-field state µ ∈ Rm, and any poicies π1, π2 ∈ Π that are optimal
under some mean-field states µ1, µ2, respectively, we have∥∥Λ2(µ, π1)− Λ2(µ, π2)∥∥2 = ∥∥(I − A+BK∗)−1B · (bπ1 − bπ2)∥∥2
≤ [1− ρ(A− BK∗)]−1 · ‖B‖2 · ‖bπ1 − bπ2‖2
= c−12 L3 · ‖π1 − π2‖2, (E.4)
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where in the last equality, we use the fact that Kπ1 = Kπ2 = K
∗ by Proposition 3.4. Here
L3 is defined in Assumption 3.1, and bπ1 and bπ2 are the parameters of the policies π1 and
π2.
Now we show that the operator Λ(·) is a contraction. For any µ1, µ2 ∈ Rm, it holds that∥∥Λ(µ1)− Λ(µ2)∥∥2 =∥∥∥Λ2(µ1,Λ1(µ1))− Λ2(µ2,Λ1(µ2))∥∥∥2
≤
∥∥∥Λ2(µ1,Λ1(µ1))− Λ2(µ1,Λ1(µ2))∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥Λ2(µ1,Λ1(µ2))− Λ2(µ2,Λ1(µ2))∥∥∥
2
≤ c−12 L3·
∥∥Λ1(µ1)− Λ1(µ2)∥∥2 + L2 · ‖µ1 − µ2‖2
≤ c−12 L3 · c2L1 · ‖µ1 − µ2‖2 + L2 · ‖µ1 − µ2‖2 = (L1L3 + L2) · ‖µ1 − µ2‖2,
where the first inequality comes from triangle inequality, the second inequality comes from
(E.3) and (E.4), and the last inequality comes from (E.2). By Assumption 3.1, we know
that L0 = L1L3+L2 < 1, which shows that the operator Λ(·) is a contraction. Moreover, by
Banach fixed-point theorem, we obtain that Λ(·) has a unique fixed point, which gives the
unique equilibrium pair of Problem 2.1. We finish the proof of the proposition.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. By the definition of J2(K, b) in (3.6) and the definition of µK,b in (3.2), the problem
min
b
J2(K, b)
is equivalent to the following constrained problem,
min
µ,b
(
µ
b
)⊤(
Q+K⊤RK −K⊤R
−RK R
)(
µ
b
)
s.t. (I − A+BK)µ− (Bb+ Aµ+ d) = 0. (E.5)
Following from the KKT conditions of (E.5), it holds that
2MK
(
µ
b
)
+NKλ = 0, N
⊤
K
(
µ
b
)
+ Aµ+ d = 0, (E.6)
where
MK =
(
Q+K⊤RK −K⊤R
−RK R
)
, NK =
(
−(I − A+BK)⊤
B⊤
)
.
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By solving (E.6), the minimizer of (E.5) takes the form of(
µK,bK
bK
)
= −M−1K NK(N⊤KM−1K NK)−1(Aµ+ d). (E.7)
By substituting (E.7) into the definition of J2(K, b) in (3.6), we have
J2(K, b
K) = (Aµ+ d)⊤(N⊤KM
−1
K NK)
−1(Aµ+ d). (E.8)
Meanwhile, by calculation, we have
M−1K =
(
Q−1 Q−1K⊤
KQ−1 KQ−1K⊤ +R−1
)
.
Therefore, the term N⊤KM
−1
K NK in (E.8) takes the form of
N⊤KM
−1
K NK = (I − A)Q−1(I − A⊤) +BR−1B⊤. (E.9)
By plugging (E.9) into (E.8), we have
J2(K, b
K) = (Aµ+ d)⊤
[
(I −A)Q−1(I − A⊤) +BR−1B⊤]−1(Aµ+ d).
Also, by plugging (E.9) into (E.7), we have(
µK,bK
bK
)
=
(
Q−1(I −A)⊤
KQ−1(I − A)⊤ −R−1B⊤
)[
(I − A)Q−1(I − A)⊤ +BR−1B⊤]−1(Aµ+ d).
We finish the proof of the proposition.
E.3 Proof of Proposition B.2
Proof. By the definition of the cost function c(x, u) in Problem 2.2 (recall that we drop the
subscript µ when we focus on Problem 2.2), we have
Ect = E(x
⊤
t Qxt + u
⊤
t Rut + µ
⊤Qµ)
= E(x⊤t Qxt + x
⊤
t K
⊤RKxt − 2b⊤RKxt + b⊤Rb+ σ2η⊤t Rηt + µ⊤Qµ)
= E
[
x⊤t (Q+K
⊤RK)xt − 2b⊤RKxt
]
+ b⊤Rb+ σ2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ, (E.10)
where we write ct = c(xt, ut) for notational convenience. Here in the second line we use
ut = πK,b(xt) = −Kxt + b+ σηt. Therefore, combining (E.10) and the definition of J(K, b)
55
in Problem 2.2, we have
J(K, b) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
{
E
[
x⊤t (Q+K
⊤RK)xt − 2b⊤RKxt
]
+ b⊤Rb+ σ2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ
}
= Ex∼N (µK,b,ΦK)
[
x⊤(Q+K⊤RK)x− 2b⊤RKx]+ b⊤Rb+ σ2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ
= tr
[
(Q+K⊤RK)ΦK
]
+ µ⊤K,b(Q+K
⊤RK)µK,b − 2b⊤RKµK,b (E.11)
+ b⊤Rb+ σ2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ.
Now, by iteratively applying (3.3) and (3.4), we have
tr
[
(Q+K⊤RK)ΦK
]
= tr(PKΨǫ), (E.12)
where PK is given in (3.4). Combining (E.11) and (E.12), we know that
J(K, b) = J1(K) + J2(K, b) + σ
2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ,
where
J1(K) = tr
[
(Q+K⊤RK)ΦK
]
= tr(PKΨǫ),
J2(K, b) =
(
µK,b
b
)⊤(
Q+K⊤RK −K⊤R
−RK R
)(
µK,b
b
)
.
We finish the proof of the proposition.
E.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. By calculating the Hessian matrix of J2(K, b), we have
∇2bbJ2(K, b) =B⊤(I − A+BK)−⊤(Q+K⊤RK)(I −A +BK)−1B
− [RK(I −A+BK)−1B +B⊤(I − A+BK)−⊤K⊤R]+R
=
[
R1/2K(I −A +BK)−1B − R1/2]⊤[R1/2K(I − A+BK)−1B − R1/2]
+B⊤(I − A+BK)−⊤Q(I −A+BK)−1B,
which is a positive definite matrix independent of b. We denote by its minimum singular
value as νK . Also, note that ‖∇2bbJ2(K, b)‖2 is upper bounded as∥∥∇2bbJ2(K, b)∥∥2 ≤ [1− ρ(A− BK)]−2 · (‖B‖22 · ‖K‖22 · ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · ‖Q‖2).
Therefore, it holds that
ιK ≤
[
1− ρ(A− BK)]−2 · (‖B‖22 · ‖K‖22 · ‖R‖2 + ‖B‖22 · ‖Q‖2),
where ιK is the maximum singular value of ∇2bbJ2(K, b). We finish the proof of the proposi-
tion.
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E.5 Proof of Proposition B.3
Proof. Following from Proposition B.2, it holds that
J1(K) = tr(PKΨǫ) = Ey∼N (0,Ψǫ)(y
⊤PKy) = Ey∼N (0,Ψǫ)
[
fK(y)
]
, (E.13)
where fK(y) = y
⊤PKy. By the definition of PK in (3.4), we obtain that
∇KfK(y) = ∇K
{
y⊤(Q +K⊤RK)y +
[
(A− BK)y]⊤PK[(A−BK)y]⊤}
= 2RKyy⊤ +∇K
[
fK
(
(A−BK)y)]. (E.14)
Also, we have
∇K
[
fK
(
(A− BK)y)] = ∇KfK((A−BK)y)− 2B⊤PK(A− BK)yy⊤. (E.15)
By plugging (E.15) into (E.14), we have
∇KfK(y) = 2
[
(R +B⊤PKB)K − B⊤PKA
]
yy⊤ +∇KfK
(
(A− BK)y). (E.16)
By iteratively applying (E.16), it holds that
∇KfK(y) = 2
[
(R +B⊤PKB)K −B⊤PKA
] · ∞∑
t=0
yty
⊤
t , (E.17)
where yt+1 = (A−BK)yt with y0 = y. Now, combining (E.13) and (E.17), it holds that
∇KJ1(K) = 2
[
(R +B⊤PKB)K − B⊤PKA
]
ΦK = 2(Υ
22
KK −Υ21K ) · ΦK ,
where ΥK is defined in (3.7). Meanwhile, combining the form of µK,b in (3.2), it holds by
calculation that
∇bJ2(K, b) = 2
[
Υ22K (−KµK,b + b) + Υ21KµK,b + qK,b
]
,
where qK,b is defined in (3.7). We finish the proof of the proposition.
E.6 Proof of Proposition B.1
Proof. From the definition of VK,b(x) in (B.1) and the definition of the cost function c(x, u)
in Problem 2.2, it holds that
VK,b(x) =
∞∑
t=0
{
E
[
x⊤t (Q+K
⊤RK)xt − 2b⊤RKxt
+ b⊤Rb+ σ2η⊤t Rηt + µ
⊤Qµ | x0 = x
] − J(K, b)}.
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Combining (3.1), we know that VK,b(x) is a quadratic function taking the form of VK,b(x) =
x⊤Gx + r⊤x + h, where G, r, and h are functions of K and b. Note that VK,b(x) satisfies
that
VK,b(x) = c(x,−Kx + b)− J(K, b) + E
[
VK,b(x
′) | x], (E.18)
by substituting the form of c(x,−Kx + b) in Problem 2.2 and J(K, b) in (3.5) into (E.18),
we obtain that
x⊤Gx+ r⊤x+ h
= x⊤(Q+K⊤RK)x− 2b⊤RKx+ b⊤Rb+ µ⊤Qµ (E.19)
− [tr(PKΨǫ) + µ⊤K,b(Q+K⊤RK)µK,b − 2b⊤RKµK,b + µ⊤Qµ+ b⊤Rb]
+
[
(A−BK)x+ (Bb+ Aµ+ d)]⊤G[(A−BK)x+ (Bb+ Aµ+ d)]
+ tr(GΨǫ) + r
⊤
[
(A− BK)x+ (Bb+ Aµ+ d)]+ h− σ2 · tr(R).
By comparing the quadratic terms and linear terms on both the LHS and RHS in (E.19),
we obtain that
G = PK , r = 2fK,b,
where fK,b = (I−A+BK)−⊤[(A−BK)⊤PK(Bb+Aµ+d)−K⊤Rb]. Also, by the definition
of VK,b(x) in (B.1), we know that E[VK,b(x)] = 0, where the expectation is taken following
the stationary distribution generated by the policy πK,b and the state transition. Therefore,
we have
h = −2fK,bµK,b − µ⊤K,bPKµK,b − tr(PKΦK),
which shows that
VK,b(x) = x
⊤PKx− tr(PKΦK) + 2f⊤K,b(x− µK,b)− µ⊤K,bPKµK,b. (E.20)
For the action-value function QK,b(x, u), by plugging (E.20) into (B.2), we obtain that
QK,b(x, u) =
(
x
u
)⊤
ΥK
(
x
u
)
+ 2
(
pK,b
qK,b
)⊤(
x
u
)
− tr(PKΦK)− σ2 · tr(R + PKBB⊤)
− b⊤Rb+ 2b⊤RKµK,b − µ⊤K,b(Q+K⊤RK + PK)µK,b
+ 2f⊤K,b
[
(Aµ+ d)− µK,b
]
+ (Aµ+ d)⊤PK(Aµ+ d).
We finish the proof of the proposition.
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E.7 Proof of Proposition B.5
Proof. By Proposition B.1, it holds that QK,b takes the following linear form
QK,b(x, u) = ψ(x, u)
⊤αK,b + βK,b, (E.21)
where βK,b is a scalar independent of x and u. Note that QK,b(x, u) satisfies that
QK,b(x, u) = c(x, u)− J(K, b) + EπK,b
[
QK,b(x
′, u′) | x, u], (E.22)
where (x′, u′) is the state-action pair after (x, u) following the policy πK,b and the state
transition. Combining (E.21) and (E.22), we obtain that
ψ(x, u)⊤αK,b = c(x, u)− J(K, b) + EπK,b
[
ψ(x′, u′) | x, u]⊤αK,b. (E.23)
By left multiplying ψ(x, u) to both sides of (E.23), and taking the expectation, we have
EπK,b
{
ψ(x, u)
[
ψ(x, u)− ψ(x′, u′)]⊤} · αK,b + EπK,b[ψ(x, u)] · J(K, b) = EπK,b[c(x, u)ψ(x, u)].
Combining the definition of the matrix ΘK,b in (B.7), we have(
1 0
EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ΘK,b
)(
J(K, b)
αK,b
)
=
(
J(K, b)
EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]) ,
which concludes the proof of the proposition.
E.8 Proof of Proposition B.6
Proof. Invertibility and Upper Bound. We denote by zt = (x
⊤
t , u
⊤
t )
⊤ for any t ≥ 0.
Then following from the state transition and the policy πK,b, the transition of {zt}t≥0 takes
the form of
zt+1 = Lzt + ν + δt, (E.24)
where L, ν and δ are defined as
L =
(
A B
−KA −KB
)
, ν =
(
Aµ+ d
−K(Aµ+ d) + b
)
, δt =
(
ωt
−Kωt + σηt
)
.
Note that L also takes the form of
L =
(
I
−K
)(
A B
)
.
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Combining the fact that ρ(UV ) = ρ(V U) for any matrices U and V , we know that ρ(L) =
ρ(A−BK) < 1, which verifies the stability of (E.24). Following from the stability of (E.24),
we know that the Markov chain generated by (E.24) admits a unique stationary distribution
N (µz,Σz), where µz and Σz satisfy that
µz = Lµz + ν, Σz = LΣzL
⊤ +Ψδ.
where
Ψδ =
(
Ψω −ΨωK⊤
−KΨω KΨωK⊤ + σ2I
)
.
Also, we know that Σz takes the form of
Σz = Cov
[(
x
u
)]
=
(
ΦK −ΦKK⊤
−KΦK KΦKK⊤ + σ2I
)
=
(
0 0
0 σ2I
)
+
(
I
−K
)
ΦK
(
I
−K
)⊤
,
(E.25)
where ΦK is defined in (3.3).
The following lemma establishes the form of ΘK,b.
Lemma E.2. The matrix ΘK,b in (B.7) takes the form of
ΘK,b =
(
2(Σz ⊗s Σz)(I − L⊗s L)⊤ 0
0 Σz(I − L)⊤
)
.
Proof. See §F.9 for a detailed proof.
Note that since ρ(L) < 1, both I −L⊗s L and I −L are positive definite. Therefore, by
Lemma E.2, the matrix ΘK,b is invertible. This finishes the proof of the invertibility of ΘK,b.
Moreover, by (E.25) and Lemma E.2, we upper bound the spectral norm of ΘK,b as
‖ΘK,b‖2 ≤ 2max
{
‖Σz‖22 ·
(
1 + ‖L‖22
)
, ‖Σz‖2 ·
(
1 + ‖L‖2
)} ≤ 4(1 + ‖K‖2F)2 · ‖ΦK‖22,
which proves the upper bound of ‖ΘK,b‖2.
Minimum singular value. To lower bound σmin(Θ˜K,b), we only need to upper bound
σmax(Θ˜
−1
K,b) = ‖Θ˜−1K,b‖2. We first calculate Θ˜−1K,b. Recall that the matrix Θ˜K,b in (B.8) takes
the form of
Θ˜K,b =
(
1 0
EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ΘK,b
)
.
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By the definition of the feature vector ψ(x, u) in (B.5), the vector σ˜z = EπK,b [ψ(x, u)] takes
the form of
σ˜z = EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
=
(
svec(Σz)
0k+m
)
,
where 0k+m denotes the all-zero column vector with dimension k + m. Also, since ΘK,b is
invertible, the matrix Θ˜K,b is also invertible, whose inverse takes the form of
Θ˜−1K,b =
(
1 0
−Θ−1K,b · σ˜z Θ−1K,b
)
.
The following lemma upper bounds the spectral norm of Θ˜−1K,b.
Lemma E.3. The spectral norm of the matrix Θ˜−1K,b is upper bounded by a positive constant
λ˜K , where λ˜K only depends on ‖K‖2 and ρ(A− BK).
Proof. See §F.10 for a detailed proof.
By Lemma E.3, we know that σmin(Θ˜K,b) is lower bounded by a positive constant λK =
1/λ˜K , which only depends on ‖K‖2 and ρ(A − BK). This concludes the proof of the
proposition.
F Proofs of Lemmas
F.1 Proof of Lemma D.1
Proof. Following from (3.4), it holds that
y⊤PK2y =
∑
t≥0
y⊤
[
(A−BK2)t
]⊤
(Q+K⊤2 RK2)(A− BK2)ty. (F.1)
Meanwhile, by the state transition yt+1 = (A− BK2)yt, we know that
yt = (A− BK2)ty0 = (A− BK2)ty. (F.2)
By plugging (F.2) into (F.1), it holds that
y⊤PK2y =
∑
t≥0
y⊤t (Q+K
⊤
2 RK2)yt =
∑
t≥0
(y⊤t Qyt + y
⊤
t K
⊤
2 RK2yt). (F.3)
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Also, it holds that
y⊤PK1y =
∑
t≥0
(y⊤t+1PK1yt+1 − y⊤t PK1yt) (F.4)
Combining (F.3) and (F.4), we have
y⊤PK2y − y⊤PK1y =
∑
t≥0
(y⊤t Qyt + y
⊤
t K
⊤
2 RK2yt + y
⊤
t+1PK1yt+1 − y⊤t PK1yt). (F.5)
Also, by the state transition yt+1 = (A− BK2)yt, it holds for any t ≥ 0 that
y⊤t Qyt + y
⊤
t K
⊤
2 RK2yt + y
⊤
t+1PK1yt+1 − y⊤t PK1yt
= y⊤t
[
Q+ (K2 −K1 +K1)⊤R(K2 −K1 +K1)
]
yt
+ y⊤t
[
A− BK1 −B(K2 −K1)
]⊤
PK1
[
A− BK1 −B(K2 −K1)
]
yt − y⊤t PK1yt
= 2y⊤t (K2 −K1)⊤
[
(R +B⊤PK1B)K1 − B⊤PK1A
]
yt
+ y⊤t (K2 −K1)⊤(R +B⊤PK1B)(K2 −K1)yt
= 2y⊤t (K2 −K1)⊤(Υ22K1K1 −Υ21K1)yt + y⊤t (K2 −K1)⊤Υ22K1(K2 −K1)yt, (F.6)
where the matrix ΥK1 is defined in (3.7). By plugging (F.6) into (F.5), we have
y⊤PK2y − y⊤PK1y
=
∑
t≥0
2y⊤t (K2 −K1)⊤(Υ22K1K1 −Υ21K1)yt + y⊤t (K2 −K1)⊤Υ22K1(K2 −K1)yt
=
∑
t≥0
DK1,K2(yt),
where DK1,K2(y) = 2y
⊤(K2−K1)(Υ22K1K1−Υ21K1)y+y⊤(K2−K1)⊤Υ22K1(K2−K1)y. We finish
the proof of the lemma.
F.2 Proof of Lemma D.2
Proof. We prove (D.16) and (D.17) separately in the sequel.
Proof of (D.16). From the definition of J1(K) in (3.6), we have
J1(K)− J1(K∗) = tr(PKΨǫ − PK∗Ψǫ) = Ey∼N (0,Ψǫ)(y⊤PKy − y⊤PK∗y)
= −E
[∑
t≥0
DK,K∗(yt)
]
, (F.7)
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where in the last equality, we apply Lemma D.1 and the expectation is taken following the
transition yt+1 = (A−BK∗)yt with initial state y0 ∼ N (0,Ψǫ). Here we denote by DK,K∗(y)
as
DK,K∗(y) = 2y
⊤(K∗ −K)(Υ22KK −Υ21K )y + y⊤(K∗ −K)⊤Υ22K (K∗ −K)y.
Also, we write DK,K∗(y) as
DK,K∗(y) = 2y
⊤(K∗ −K)(Υ22KK −Υ21K )y + y⊤(K∗ −K)⊤Υ22K (K∗ −K)y (F.8)
= y⊤
[
K∗ −K + (Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )
]⊤
Υ22K
[
K∗ −K + (Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )
]
y
− y⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )y.
Note that the first term on the RHS of (F.8) is positive, due to the fact that it is a quadratic
form of a positive definite matrix, we lower bound DK,K∗(y) as
DK,K∗(y) ≥ −y⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )y. (F.9)
Combining (F.7) and (F.9), it holds that
J1(K)− J1(K∗) ≤
∥∥∥∥E(∑
t≥0
yty
⊤
t
)∥∥∥∥
2
· tr[(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )]
= ‖ΦK∗‖2 · tr
[
(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )
]
≤ ∥∥(Υ22K )−1∥∥2 · ‖ΦK∗‖2 · tr[(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )]
≤ σ−1min(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖2 · tr
[
(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )
]
,
where the last line comes from the fact that Υ22K = R + B
⊤PKB  R. This complete the
proof of (D.16).
Proof of (D.17). Note that for any K˜, it holds by the optimality of K∗ that
J1(K)− J1(K∗) ≥ J1(K)− J1(K˜) = −E
[∑
t≥0
DK,K˜(yt)
]
, (F.10)
where the expectation is taken following the transition yt+1 = (A−BK˜)yt with initial state
y0 ∼ N (0,Ψǫ). By taking K˜ = K − (Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK − Υ21K ) and following from a similar
calculation as in (F.8), the function DK,K˜(y) takes the form of
DK,K˜(y) = −y⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )y. (F.11)
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Combining (F.10) and (F.11), it holds that
J(K)− J(K∗) ≥ tr[ΦK˜(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22K )−1(Υ22KK −Υ21K )]
≥ σmin(Ψǫ) · ‖Υ22K ‖−12 · tr
[
(Υ22KK −Υ21K )⊤(Υ22KK −Υ21K )
]
,
where we use the fact that ΦK˜ = (A− BK˜)ΦK˜(A− BK˜)⊤ +Ψǫ  Ψǫ in the last line. This
finishes the proof of (D.17).
F.3 Proof of Lemma D.3
Proof. By Proposition B.2, we have∣∣J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn+1)∣∣ = tr[(PK˜n+1 − PKn+1)Ψǫ] ≤ ‖PK˜n+1 − PKn+1‖2 · ‖Ψǫ‖F. (F.12)
The following lemma upper bounds the term ‖PK˜n+1 − PKn+1‖2.
Lemma F.1. Suppose that the parameters K and K˜ satisfy that
‖K˜ −K‖2 ·
(‖A−BK‖2 + 1) · ‖ΦK‖2 ≤ σmin(Ψω)/4 · ‖B‖−12 , (F.13)
then it holds that
‖PK˜ − PK‖2 ≤ 6 · σ−1min(Ψω) · ‖ΦK‖2 · ‖K‖2 · ‖R‖2 · ‖K˜ −K‖2 (F.14)
· (‖B‖2 · ‖K‖2) · ‖A− BK‖2 + ‖B‖2 · ‖K‖2 + 1).
Proof. See Lemma 5.7 in Yang et al. (2019) for a detailed proof.
To use Lemma F.1, it suffices to verify that K˜n+1 and Kn+1 satisfy (F.13). Note that
from the definitions of Kn+1 and K˜n+1 in (D.18) and (D.21), respectively, we have
‖K˜n+1 −Kn+1‖2 ·
(‖A−BK˜n+1‖2 + 1) · ‖ΦK˜n+1‖2
≤ γ · ‖Υ̂Kn −ΥKn‖F ·
(
1 + ‖Kn‖2
) · (‖A− BK˜n+1‖2 + 1) · ‖ΦK˜n+1‖2. (F.15)
Now, we upper bound the RHS of (F.15). For the term ‖A − BK˜n+1‖2, it holds by the
definition of K˜n+1 in (D.21) that
‖A−BK˜n+1‖2 ≤ ‖A−BKn‖2 + γ · ‖B‖2 · ‖Υ22KnKn −Υ21Kn‖2
≤ ‖A−BKn‖2 + γ · ‖B‖2 · ‖ΥKn‖2 ·
(
1 + ‖Kn‖2
)
. (F.16)
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By the definition of ΥKn in (3.7), we upper bound ‖ΥKn‖2 as
‖ΥKn‖2 ≤ ‖Q‖2 + ‖R‖2 +
(‖A‖F + ‖B‖F)2 · ‖PKn‖2
≤ ‖Q‖2 + ‖R‖2 +
(‖A‖F + ‖B‖F)2 · J1(K0) · σ−1min(Ψǫ), (F.17)
where the last line comes from the fact that
J1(K0) ≥ J1(Kn) = tr
[
(Q +K⊤n RKn)ΦKn
]
= tr(PKnΨǫ) ≥ ‖PKn‖2 · σmin(Ψǫ).
As for the term ‖ΦK˜n+1‖2 in (F.15), from the fact that
J1(K0) ≥ J1(K˜n+1) = tr
[
(Q+ K˜⊤n+1RK˜n+1)ΦK˜n+1
] ≥ ‖ΦK˜n+1‖2 · σmin(Q),
it holds that
‖ΦK˜n+1‖2 ≤ J1(K0) · σ−1min(Q). (F.18)
Therefore, combining (F.15), (F.16), (F.17), and (F.18), we know that
‖K˜n+1 −Kn+1‖2 ·
(‖A− BK˜n+1‖2 + 1) · ‖ΦK˜n+1‖2
≤ poly1
(‖Kn‖2) · ‖Υ̂Kn −ΥKn‖F. (F.19)
From Theorem B.8, it holds with probability at least 1− T−4n − T˜−6n that
‖Υ̂Kn −ΥKn‖F ≤
poly3
(‖Kn‖F, ‖µ‖2)
λKn · (1− ρ)2
· log
3 Tn
T
1/4
n
(F.20)
+
poly4
(‖Kn‖F, ‖b0‖2, ‖µ‖2)
λKn
· log
1/2 T˜n
T˜
1/8
n · (1− ρ)
,
which holds for any ρ ∈ (ρ(A − BKn), 1). Note that from the choice of Tn and T˜n in the
statement of Theorem B.4 that
Tn ≥ poly5
(‖Kn‖F, ‖b0‖2, ‖µ‖2) · λ−4Kn · [1− ρ(A−BKn)]−9 · ε−5,
T˜n ≥ poly6
(‖Kn‖F, ‖b0‖2, ‖µ‖2) · λ−2Kn · [1− ρ(A−BKn)]−12 · ε−12,
it holds that
poly3
(‖Kn‖F, ‖µ‖2)
λKn · (1− ρ)2
· log
3 Tn
T
1/4
n
+
poly4
(‖Kn‖F, ‖b0‖2, ‖µ‖2)
λKn
· log
1/2 T˜n
T˜
1/8
n · (1− ρ)
≤ min
{[
poly1
(‖Kn‖2)]−1 · σmin(Ψω)/4 · ‖B‖−12 , (F.21)[
poly2
(‖Kn‖2)]−1 · ε/8 · γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖−12 · ‖Ψǫ‖−1F }.
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Combining (F.19), (F.20), and (F.21), we know that (F.13) holds with probability at least
1 − ε15 for sufficiently small ε > 0. Meanwhile, by (F.16), (F.17), and (F.18), the RHS of
(F.14) is upper bounded as
6 · σ−1min(Ψω) · ‖ΦK˜n+1‖2 · ‖K˜n+1‖2 · ‖R‖2 · ‖K˜n+1 −Kn+1‖2
· (‖B‖2 · ‖K˜n+1‖2) · ‖A− BK˜n+1‖2 + ‖B‖2 · ‖K˜n+1‖2 + 1)
≤ poly2
(‖Kn‖2) · ‖Υ̂Kn −ΥKn‖F. (F.22)
Now, by Lemma F.1, it holds with probability at least 1− ε15 that
‖PK˜n+1 − PKn+1‖2 ≤ 6 · σ−1min(Ψω) · ‖ΦK˜n+1‖2 · ‖K˜n+1‖2 · ‖R‖2 · ‖K˜n+1 −Kn+1‖2
· (‖B‖2 · ‖K˜n+1‖2) · ‖A−BK˜n+1‖2 + ‖B‖2 · ‖K˜n+1‖2 + 1)
≤ poly2
(‖Kn‖2) · ‖Υ̂Kn −ΥKn‖F
≤ ε/8 · γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖−12 · ‖Ψǫ‖−1F , (F.23)
where the second inequality comes from (F.22), and the last inequality comes from (F.20)
and (F.21). Combining (F.12) and (F.23), it holds with probability at least 1− ε15 that∣∣J1(K˜n+1)− J1(Kn+1)∣∣ ≤ γ · σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖ΦK∗‖−12 · ε/4,
which concludes the proof of the lemma.
F.4 Proof of Lemma D.4
Proof. Note that Υ22K∗K
∗ − Υ21K∗ is the natural gradient of J1 at the minimizer K∗, which
implies that
Υ22K∗K
∗ −Υ21K∗ = 0. (F.24)
By Lemma D.1, it holds that
J1(K)− J1(K∗) = tr(PKΨǫ − PK∗Ψǫ) = Ey∼N (0,Ψǫ)(y⊤PKy − y⊤PK∗y)
= E
{∑
t≥0
[
2y⊤t (K −K∗)(Υ22K∗K∗ −Υ21K∗)yt + y⊤t (K −K∗)⊤Υ22K∗(K −K∗)yt
]}
= E
{∑
t≥0
y⊤t (K −K∗)⊤Υ21K∗(K −K∗)yt
}
, (F.25)
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where we use (F.24) in the last line. Here the expectations are taken following the transition
yt+1 = (A−BK)yt with initial state y0 ∼ N (0,Ψǫ). Also, we have
E
{∑
t≥0
y⊤t (K −K∗)⊤Υ22K∗(K −K∗)yt
}
= tr
[
ΦK(K −K∗)⊤Υ22K∗(K −K∗)
]
≥ ‖ΦK‖2 · ‖Υ22K∗‖2 · tr
[
(K −K∗)⊤(K −K∗)]
≥ σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖K −K∗‖2F, (F.26)
where we use the fact that ΦK = (A−BK)ΦK(A−BK)+Ψǫ  Ψǫ and Υ22K∗ = R+B⊤PK∗B 
R in the last line. Combining (F.25) and (F.26), we have
J1(K)− J1(K∗) ≥ σmin(Ψǫ) · σmin(R) · ‖K −K∗‖2F.
We conclude the proof of the lemma.
F.5 Proof of Lemma D.5
Proof. Following from Proposition 3.3, we have
J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , b˜h+1)
≤ γb · ∇bJ2(KN , b˜h+1)⊤
[∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)]
+ (γb)2 · νKN/2 ·
∥∥∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)∥∥22,
J2(KN , b˜h+1)− J2(KN , bh+1)
≤ −γb · ∇bJ2(KN , b˜h+1)⊤
[∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)]
− (γb)2 · ιKN/2 ·
∥∥∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)∥∥22, (F.27)
where νKN and ιKN are defined in Proposition 3.3. Also, following from Proposition B.3, it
holds that∥∥∇bJ2(KN , b˜h+1)∥∥2 ≤ poly1(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(KN , b0)) · [1− ρ(A− BKN)]−1. (F.28)
Combining (F.27), (F.28), and the fact that νKN ≤ ιKN ≤ [1−ρ(A−BKN )]−2 ·poly2(‖KN‖2),
we know that∣∣J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , b˜h+1)∣∣ (F.29)
≤ (γb)2 · poly2
(‖KN‖2) · ∥∥∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)∥∥22 · [1− ρ(A− BKN)]−2
+ γb · poly1
(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(KN , b0)) · ∥∥∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)∥∥2
· [1− ρ(A− BKN)]−1.
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Note that from the definition of ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh) and ∇bJ2(KN , bh) in (D.31) and (D.33), re-
spectively, it holds by triangle inequality that∥∥∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)∥∥2
≤ ‖Υ̂22KN −Υ22KN‖2 · ‖KN‖2 · ‖µ̂KN ,bh‖2 + ‖Υ22KN‖2 · ‖KN‖2 · ‖µ̂KN ,bh − µKN ,bh‖2
+ ‖Υ̂22KN −Υ22KN‖2 · ‖bh‖2 + ‖Υ̂21KN −Υ21KN‖2 · ‖µ̂KN ,bh‖2 + ‖Υ21KN‖2 · ‖µ̂KN ,bh − µKN ,bh‖2
+ ‖q̂KN ,bh − qKN ,bh‖2.
By Theorem B.8, combining the fact that J2(KN , bh) ≤ J2(KN , b0) and the fact that ‖µKN ,b‖2 ≤
J(KN , b0)/σmin(Q), we know that with probability at least 1− (T bn)−4 − (T˜ bn)−6, it holds for
any ρ ∈ (ρ(A−BKN ), 1) that∥∥∇bJ2(KN , bh)− ∇̂bJ2(KN , bh)∥∥2 (F.30)
≤ λ−1KN · poly3
(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J2(KN , b0)) · [ log3 T bn
(T bn)
1/4(1− ρ)2 +
log1/2 T˜ bn
(T˜ bn)
1/8 · (1− ρ)
]
.
Following from the choices of γb, T bn, and T˜
b
n in the statement of Theorem B.4, it holds that
γb · poly1
(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(KN , b0)) · λ−1KN · poly3(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J2(KN , b0))
·
[
log3 T bn
(T bn)
1/4(1− ρ)2 +
log1/2 T˜ bn
(T˜ bn)
1/8 · (1− ρ)
]
· [1− ρ(A−BKN )]−1 + [1− ρ(A− BKN)]−2
· poly3
(‖KN‖F, ‖bh‖2, ‖µ‖2, J2(KN , b0)) · [ log6 T bn
(T bn)
1/2(1− ρ)4 +
log T˜ bn
(T˜ bn)
1/4 · (1− ρ)2
]
· (γb)2 · poly2
(‖KN‖2) · λ−1KN
≤ νKN · γb · ε/2.
Further combining (F.29) and (F.30), it holds with probability at least 1− ε15 that∣∣J2(KN , bh+1)− J2(KN , b˜h+1)∣∣ ≤ νKN · γb · ε/2.
We then finish the proof of the lemma.
F.6 Proof of Lemma D.6
Proof. We show that ζK,b ∈ Vζ and ξ(ζ) ∈ Vξ for any ζ ∈ Vζ separately.
Part 1. First we show that ζK,b ∈ Vζ . Note that from Definition B.7, we know that
ζ1K,b = J(K, b) satisfies that 0 ≤ ζ1K,b ≤ J(K0, b0). It remains to show that ζ2K,b = αK,b
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satisfies that ‖ζ2K,b‖2 ≤Mζ . By the definition of αK,b in (B.6), we know that
‖αK,b‖22 ≤ ‖ΥK‖2F + ‖ΥK‖22 ·
(‖µK,b‖22 + ‖µuK,b‖22)
+
(‖A‖2 + ‖B‖2)2 · (‖PK‖2 · ‖Aµ+ d‖2 + ‖fK,b‖2)2 (F.31)
where fK,b = (I − A + BK)−⊤[(A − BK)⊤PK(Bb + Aµ + d) − K⊤Rb] and for notational
simplicity, we denote by µuK,b = −KµK,b + b. We only need to bound ΥK , µK,b, µuK,b, PK ,
and fK,b. Note that by Proposition B.2, the expected total cost J(K, b) takes the form of
J(K, b) = tr(PKΨǫ) + µ
⊤
K,bQµK,b + (µ
u
K,b)
⊤RµuK,b + σ
2 · tr(R) + µ⊤Qµ.
Thus, we have
J(K0, b0) ≥ J(K, b) ≥ σmin(Ψω) · tr(PK) ≥ σmin(Ψω) · ‖PK‖2,
J(K0, b0) ≥ J(K, b) ≥ µ⊤K,bQµK,b ≥ σmin(Q) · ‖µK,b‖2,
J(K0, b0) ≥ J(K, b) ≥ (µuK,b)⊤RµuK,b ≥ σmin(R) · ‖µuK,b‖2,
which imply that
‖PK‖2 ≤ J(K0, b0)/σmin(Ψω),
‖µK,b‖2 ≤ J(K0, b0)/σmin(Q),
‖µuK,b‖2 ≤ J(K0, b0)/σmin(R). (F.32)
For ΥK , it holds that
ΥK =
(
Q 0
0 R
)
+
(
A⊤
B⊤
)
PK
(
A B
)
,
which gives
‖ΥK‖F ≤ (‖Q‖F + ‖R‖F) +
(‖A‖2F + ‖B‖2F) · ‖PK‖F,
‖ΥK‖2 ≤ (‖Q‖2 + ‖R‖2) +
(‖A‖2 + ‖B‖2)2 · ‖PK‖2.
Combining (F.32) and the fact that ‖PK‖F ≤ √m · ‖PK‖2, we know that
‖ΥK‖F ≤
(‖Q‖F + ‖R‖F)+ (‖A‖2F + ‖B‖2F) · √m · J(K0, b0)/σmin(Ψω),
‖ΥK‖2 ≤
(‖Q‖2 + ‖R‖2)+ (‖A‖2 + ‖B‖2)2 · J(K0, b0)/σmin(Ψω). (F.33)
69
Now, we upper bound the vector fK,b. Note that by algebra, the vector fK,b takes the form
of
fK,b = −PKµK,b + (I − A+BK)−T (QµK,b −K⊤RµuK,b).
Therefore, we upper bound fK,b as
‖fK,b‖2 ≤ J(K0, b0)2 · σ−1min(Ψω) · σ−1min(Q) +
[
1− ρ(A− BK)]−1 · (κQ + κR · ‖K‖F) (F.34)
Combining (F.31), (F.32), (F.33), and (F.34), it holds that
‖ζ2K,b‖2 = ‖αK,b‖2 ≤Mζ,1 +Mζ,2 · (1 + ‖K‖F) · [1− ρ(A− BK)]−1.
Therefore, it holds that ζK,b ∈ Vζ.
Part 2. Now we show that for any ζ ∈ Vζ , we have ξ(ζ) ∈ Vξ. Recall that from (D.41), it
holds that
ξ1(ζ) = ζ1 − J(K, b), ξ2(ζ) = EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
ζ1 +ΘK,bζ
2 − EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]
. (F.35)
Then we have ∣∣ξ1(ζ)∣∣ = ∣∣ζ1 − J(K, b)∣∣ ≤ J(K0, b0), (F.36)
where we use the fact that since ζ ∈ Vζ , we have 0 ≤ ζ1 ≤ J(K0, b0) by Definition B.7. Also,
by (F.35), we have∥∥ξ2(ζ)∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥EπK,b[ψ(x, u)]ζ1∥∥∥
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
+ ‖ΘK,b‖2 · ‖ζ2‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
+
∥∥∥EπK,b[c(x, u)ψ(x, u)]∥∥∥
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3
. (F.37)
Note that we upper bound B1 as
B1 ≤ J(K0, b0) ·
∥∥∥EπK,b[ψ(x, u)]∥∥∥
2
. (F.38)
Following from the definition of ψ(x, u) in (B.5), we know that∥∥∥EπK,b[ψ(x, u)]∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖Σz‖F, (F.39)
where Σz is defined as
Σz = Cov
[(
x
u
)]
=
(
ΦK −ΦKK⊤
−KΦK KΦKK⊤ + σ2I
)
=
(
0 0
0 σ2I
)
+
(
I
−K
)
ΦK
(
I
−K
)⊤
.
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Combining (F.38) and (F.39), we have
B1 ≤ J(K0, b0) · ‖Σz‖F. (F.40)
By Proposition B.6, we upper bound B2 as
B2 ≤ 4(1 + ‖K‖2F)3 · ‖ΦK‖22 · (Mζ,1 +Mζ,2) ·
[
1− ρ(A− BK)]−1, (F.41)
where we use the fact that ζ ∈ Vζ and Definition B.7. As for the term B3 in (F.37), we
utilize the following lemma to provide an upper bound.
Lemma F.2. The vector EπK,b [c(x, u)ψ(x, u)] takes the following form,
EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]
=
2svec
[
Σzdiag(Q,R)Σz + 〈Σz, diag(Q,R)〉Σz
]
Σz
(
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
) 
+
[
µ⊤K,bQµK,b + (µ
u
K,b)
⊤RµuK,b + µ
⊤Qµ
]svec(Σz)0m
0k
 .
Here the matrix Σz takes the form of
Σz =
(
ΦK −ΦKK⊤
−KΦK KΦKK⊤ + σ2 · I
)
.
Proof. See §F.11 for a detailed proof.
From Lemma F.2 and (F.32), it holds that
B3 ≤ 3
[‖Q‖F + ‖R‖F + J(K0, b0) · ‖Q‖2/σmin(Q) (F.42)
+ J(K0, b0) · ‖R‖2/σmin(R)
] · ‖Σz‖22.
Moreover, by the definition of Σz in (E.25), combining the triangle inequality, we have the
following bounds for ‖Σz‖F and ‖Σz‖2,
‖Σz‖F ≤ 2(d+ ‖K‖2F) · ‖ΦK‖2, ‖Σz‖2 ≤ 2(1 + ‖K‖2F) · ‖ΦK‖2. (F.43)
Also, we have
J(K0, b0) ≥ J(K, b) ≥ tr
[
(Q+K⊤RK)ΦK
] ≥ ‖ΦK‖2 · σmin(Q),
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which gives the upper bound for ΦK as follows,
‖ΦK‖2 ≤ J(K0, b0)/σmin(Q). (F.44)
Therefore, combining (F.37), (F.40), (F.41), (F.42), (F.43), and (F.44), we know that∥∥ξ2(ζ)∥∥
2
≤ C · (Mζ,1 +Mζ,2) · J(K0, b0)2/σ2min(Q) (F.45)
· (1 + ‖K‖2F)3 · [1− ρ(A−BK)]−1.
By (F.36) and (F.45), we know that ξ(ζ) ∈ Vξ for any ζ ∈ Vζ . We conclude the proof of the
lemma.
F.7 Proof of Lemma D.7
Proof. Assume that z˜0 ∼ N (µ†,Σ†). Following from the fact that
z˜t+1 = Lz˜t + ν + δt,
it holds that
z˜t ∼ N
(
Ltµ† +
t−1∑
i=0
Li · ν, (L⊤)tΣ†Lt +
t−1∑
i=0
(L⊤)iΨδL
i
)
, (F.46)
where
Ψδ =
(
Ψω KΨω
KΨω KΨωK
⊤ + σ2I
)
.
From (D.47), we know that µz takes the form of
µz = (I − L)−1ν =
∞∑
j=0
Ljν. (F.47)
Therefore, combining (F.46) and (F.47), we have
E(µ̂z) = µz +
1
T˜
T˜∑
t=1
Ltµ† − 1
T˜
T˜∑
t=1
∞∑
i=t
Liν. (F.48)
We denote by
µT˜ =
T˜∑
t=1
Ltµ† −
T˜∑
t=1
∞∑
i=t
Liν.
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Meanwhile, it holds that∥∥∥∥ T˜∑
t=1
Ltµ† −
T˜∑
t=1
∞∑
i=t
Liν
∥∥∥∥
2
≤
T˜∑
t=1
ρ(L)t · ‖µ†‖2 +
T˜∑
t=1
∞∑
i=t
ρ(L)i · ‖ν‖2
≤ [1− ρ(L)]−1 · ‖µ†‖2 + [1− ρ(L)]−2 · ‖ν‖2
≤Mµ · (1− ρ)−2 · ‖µz‖2, (F.49)
where Mµ is a positive absolute constant.
For the covariance, note that for any random variablesX ∼ N (µ1,Σ1) and Y ∼ N (µ2,Σ2),
we know that Z = X + Y ∼ N (µ1 + µ2,Σ), where ‖Σ‖F ≤ 2‖Σ1‖F + 2‖Σ2‖F. Combining
(F.46), we know that µ̂z ∼ N (Eµ̂z, Σ˜T˜/T˜ ), where Σ˜T˜ satisfies that
T˜ /2 · ‖Σ˜T˜‖F ≤
T˜∑
t=1
ρ(L)2t · ‖Σ†‖F +
T˜∑
t=1
t−1∑
i=0
ρ(L)2i · ‖Ψδ‖F
≤ [1− ρ(L)2]−1 · ‖Σ†‖F + T˜ · [1− ρ(L)2]−1 · ‖Ψδ‖F,
which implies that
‖Σ˜T˜‖F ≤MΣ · (1− ρ)−1 · ‖Σz‖F, (F.50)
where MΣ is a positive absolute constant. Combining (F.48), (F.49), and (F.50), we obtain
that
µ̂z ∼ N
(
µz +
1
T˜
µT˜ ,
1
T˜
Σ˜T˜
)
,
where ‖µT˜‖2 ≤Mµ · (1− ρ)−2 · ‖µz‖2 and ‖Σ˜T˜‖F ≤MΣ · (1− ρ)−1 · ‖Σz‖F. Moreover, by the
Gaussian tail inequality, it holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6 that
‖µ̂z − µz‖2 ≤ log T˜
T˜ 1/4
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2).
Then we finish the proof of the lemma.
F.8 Proof of Lemma D.8
Proof. We continue using the notations given in §D.3. We define
F̂ (ζ, ξ) =
{
E(ψ̂)ζ1 + E
[
(ψ̂ − ψ̂′)ψ̂⊤]ζ2 − E(cψ̂)}⊤ξ2 + [ζ1 − E(c)] · ξ1 − 1/2 · ‖ξ‖22,
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where ψ̂ = ψ̂(x, u) is the estimated feature vector. Here the expectation is only taken over
the trajectory generated by the state transition and the policy πK,b, conditioning on the
randomness induced when calculating the estimated feature vectors. Thus, the function
F̂ (ζ, ξ) is still random, where the randomness comes from the estimated feature vectors.
Note that |F (ζ, ξ)− F˜ (ζ, ξ)| ≤ |F (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)|+ |F̂ (ζ, ξ)− F˜ (ζ, ξ)|. Thus, we only need
to upper bound |F (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)| and |F̂ (ζ, ξ)− F˜ (ζ, ξ)|.
Part 1. First we upper bound |F (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)|. Note that by algebra, we have∣∣F (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣{E(ψ − ψ̂)ζ1 + E[(ψ − ψ′)ψ⊤ − (ψ̂ − ψ̂′)ψ̂⊤]ζ2 − E[c(ψ − ψ̂)]}⊤ξ2∣∣∣∣
≤ E(‖ψ − ψ̂‖2) · [|ζ1|+ E(‖ψ − ψ′‖2 + 2‖ψ̂‖2) · ‖ζ2‖2 + E(c)] · ‖ξ2‖2, (F.51)
where the expectation is only taken over the trajectory generated by the state transition and
the policy πK,b. From Lemma D.7, it holds that
P
(‖µ̂z − µz + 1/T˜ · µT˜‖2 ≤ C1) ≥ 1− T˜−6. (F.52)
Therefore, combining (F.52), it holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6 that
E
(‖ψ − ψ′‖2 + 2‖ψ̂‖2) ≤ poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)), (F.53)
where the expectation is conditioned on the randomness induced when calculating the esti-
mated feature vectors. Also, we know that
E(c) ≤ poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)). (F.54)
Therefore, combining (F.51), (F.53), (F.54), and Definition B.7, it holds with probability at
least 1− T˜−6 that∣∣F (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)∣∣ ≤ E(‖ψ − ψ̂‖2) · poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)). (F.55)
Following from the definitions of ψ(x, u) in (B.5) and ψ̂(x, u) in (B.14), we upper bound
‖ψ(x, u)− ψ̂(x, u)‖2 for any x and u as
‖ψ(x, u)− ψ̂(x, u)‖22 = ‖µ̂z − µz‖22 +
∥∥z(µ̂z − µz)⊤ + (µ̂z − µz)z⊤∥∥2F + ‖µzµ⊤z − µ̂zµ̂⊤z ‖2F
≤ poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) · ‖µ̂z − µz‖22, (F.56)
74
where µz is defined in (D.47), µ̂z is defined in (D.48), and z = (x
⊤, u⊤)⊤. Also, by Lemma
D.7, we know that
‖µ̂z − µz‖2 ≤ log T˜
T˜ 1/4
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖ΦK‖2, ‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)), (F.57)
which holds with probability at least 1− T˜−6. Combining (F.55), (F.56), and (F.57), it holds
with probability at least 1− T˜−6 that
∣∣F (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)∣∣ ≤ log T˜
T˜ 1/4
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)). (F.58)
Part 2. We now upper bound |F̂ (ζ, ξ)− F˜ (ζ, ξ)| in the sequel. By definitions, we have∣∣F˜ (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣{E(ψ˜ − ψ̂)ζ1 + E[(ψ˜ − ψ˜′)ψ˜⊤ − (ψ̂ − ψ̂′)ψ̂⊤]ζ2 − E(c˜ψ˜ − ĉψ̂)}⊤ξ2 + E(ĉ− c˜)ξ1∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣{E(ψ̂)ζ1 + E(ψ̂ψ̂⊤)ζ2 − E(ĉψ̂)}⊤ξ2 + E(ĉ)ξ1∣∣∣∣ · 1Ec (F.59)
+
∣∣∣[E(ψ̂′ψ̂⊤)ζ2]⊤ξ2∣∣∣ · 1(E ′∩E)c ,
where we define the event E ′ as
E ′ =
(⋂
t∈[T ]
{∣∣‖z′t − µz + 1/T˜ · µT˜‖22 − tr(Σ˜z)∣∣ ≤ C1 · log T · ‖Σ˜z‖2})⋂ E2,
where E2 is defined in (D.55). Combining the fact that P(E2) ≥ 1− T˜−6 and Lemma G.3, it
holds that P(E ′) ≥ 1− T−5− T˜−6. Following a similar argument as in Part 1, it holds from
(F.59) that
∣∣F˜ (ζ, ξ)− F̂ (ζ, ξ)∣∣ ≤ ( 1
T
+
1
T˜ 1/4
)
· poly(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)) (F.60)
for sufficiently large T and T˜ .
Now, combining (F.58) and (F.60), by triangle inequality, it holds with probability at
least 1− T˜−6 that
∣∣F (ζ, ξ)− F˜ (ζ, ξ)∣∣ ≤ ( 1
2T
+
log T˜
T˜ 1/4
)
· (1− ρ)−2 · poly(‖K‖F, ‖b‖2, ‖µ‖2, J(K0, b0)).
We finish the proof of the lemma.
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F.9 Proof of Lemma E.2
Proof. Recall that the feature vector ψ(x, u) takes the following form
ψ(x, u) =
(
svec
[
(z − µz)(z − µz)⊤
]
z − µz
)
.
We then have
ψ(x, u)− ψ(x′, u′) =
(
svec
[
yy⊤ − (Ly + δ)(Ly + δ)⊤]
y − (Ly + δ)
)
, (F.61)
where we denote by y = z − µz, and (x′, u′) is the state-action pair after (x, u) following the
state transition and the policy πK,b. Therefore, for any symmetric matrices M , N and any
vectors m, n, it holds from (B.7) and (F.61) that(
svec(M)
m
)⊤
ΘK,b
(
svec(N)
n
)
= Ey,δ
{(
svec(M)
m
)⊤(
svec(yy⊤)
y
)(
svec
[
yy⊤ − (Ly + δ)(Ly + δ)⊤]
y − (Ly + δ)
)⊤(
svec(N)
n
)}
= Ey,δ
{(〈M, yy⊤〉+m⊤y) · [〈N, yy⊤ − (Ly + δ)(Ly + δ)⊤〉+ n⊤(y − Ly − δ)]}
= Ey
(〈yy⊤,M〉 · 〈yy⊤ − Lyy⊤L⊤ −Ψδ, N〉)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
+Ey
(〈yy⊤,M〉 · n⊤(y − Ly))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
(F.62)
+ Ey
(
m⊤y · 〈yy⊤ − Lyy⊤L⊤ −Ψδ, N〉
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
+Ey
[
m⊤y · n⊤(y − Ly)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A4
,
where the expectations are taken over y ∼ N (0,Σz) and δ ∼ N (0,Ψδ). We evaluate the
terms A1, A2, A3, and A4 in the sequel.
For the terms A2 and A3 in (F.62), by the fact that y = z − µz ∼ N (0,Σz), we know
that these two terms vanish. For A4, it holds that
A4 = Ey
[
m⊤y · (y − Ly)⊤n] = Ey[m⊤yy⊤(I − L)⊤n] = m⊤Σz(I − L)⊤n. (F.63)
For A1, by algebra, we have
A1 = Ey
(〈yy⊤,M〉 · 〈yy⊤ − Lyy⊤L⊤ −Ψδ, N〉)
= Ey
(〈yy⊤,M〉 · 〈yy⊤ − Lyy⊤L⊤, N〉)− Ey(〈yy⊤,M〉 · 〈Ψδ, N〉)
= Ey
[
y⊤My · y⊤(N − L⊤NL)y]− 〈Σz,M〉 · 〈Ψδ, N〉
= Eu∼N (0,I)
[
u⊤Σ1/2z MΣ
1/2
z u · u⊤Σ1/2z (N − L⊤NL)Σ1/2z u
]− 〈Σz,M〉 · 〈Ψδ, N〉. (F.64)
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Now, by applying Lemma G.1 to the first term on the RHS of (F.64), we know that
A1 = 2 tr
[
Σ1/2z MΣ
1/2
z · Σ1/2z (N − L⊤NL)Σ1/2z
]
+ tr(Σ1/2z MΣ
1/2
z ) · tr
[
Σ1/2z (N − L⊤NL)Σ1/2z
]− 〈Σz,M〉 · 〈Ψδ, N〉
= 2
〈
M,Σz(N − L⊤NL)Σz〉+ 〈Σz,M
〉 · 〈Σz − LΣzL⊤ −Ψδ, N〉
= 2
〈
M,Σz(N − L⊤NL)Σz
〉
,
where we use the fact that Σz = LΣzL
⊤ +Ψδ in the last equality. By using the property of
the operator svec(·) and the definition of the symmetric Kronecker product, we obtain that
A1 = 2svec(M)
⊤svec
[
Σz(N − L⊤NL)Σz
]
= 2svec(M)⊤
[
Σz ⊗s Σz − (ΣzL⊤)⊗s (ΣzL⊤)
]
svec(N)
= 2svec(M)⊤
[
(Σz ⊗s Σz)(I − L⊗s L)⊤
]
svec(N). (F.65)
Combining (F.62), (F.63), and (F.65), we obtain that(
svec(M)
m
)⊤
ΘK,b
(
svec(N)
n
)
= svec(M)⊤
[
2(Σz ⊗s Σz)(I − L⊗s L)⊤
]
svec(N) +m⊤Σz(I − L)⊤n
=
(
svec(M)
m
)⊤(
2(Σz ⊗s Σz)(I − L⊗s L)⊤ 0
0 Σz(I − L)⊤
)(
svec(N)
n
)
.
Thus, the matrix ΘK,b takes the following form,
ΘK,b =
(
2(Σz ⊗s Σz)(I − L⊗s L)⊤ 0
0 Σz(I − L)⊤
)
,
which concludes the proof of the lemma.
F.10 Proof of Lemma E.3
Proof. From the definition of Θ˜K,b in (B.9), it holds that
‖Θ˜−1K,b‖22 ≤ 1 + ‖Θ−1K,b‖22 + ‖Θ−1K,bσ˜z‖22, (F.66)
where σ˜z is defined as
σ˜z = EπK,b
[
ψ(x, u)
]
=
(
svec(Σz)
0k+m
)
.
77
We bound the RHS of (F.66) in the sequel. For the term Θ−1K,bσ˜z, combining Lemma E.2, we
have
Θ−1K,bσ˜z =
(
1/2 · (I − L⊗s L)−⊤(Σz ⊗s Σz)−1 · svec(Σz)
0k+m
)
=
(
1/2 · (I − L⊗s L)−⊤(Σ−1z ⊗s Σ−1z ) · svec(Σz)
0k+m
)
=
(
1/2 · (I − L⊗s L)−⊤ · svec(Σ−1z )
0k+m
)
, (F.67)
where we use the property of the symmetric Kronecker product in the second and last line.
By taking the spectral norm on both sides of (F.67), it holds that
‖Θ−1K,bσ˜z‖2 = 1/2 ·
∥∥(I − L⊗s L)−⊤ · svec(Σ−1z )∥∥2
≤ 1/2 · ∥∥(I − L⊗s L)−⊤∥∥2 · ∥∥svec(Σ−1z )∥∥2
≤ 1/2 · [1− ρ2(L)]−1 · ‖Σ−1z ‖F
≤ 1/2 · √k +m · [1− ρ2(L)]−1 · ‖Σ−1z ‖2
= 1/2 · √k +m · [1− ρ2(L)]−1 · σ−1min(Σz), (F.68)
where in the third line we use Lemma G.2 to the matrix L⊗s L. Similarly, we upper bound
‖Θ−1K,b‖2 in the sequel
‖Θ−1K,b‖2 ≤ min
{
1/2 · [1− ρ2(L)]−1σ−2min(Σz), [1− ρ(L)]−1σ−1min(Σz)}. (F.69)
Thus, combining (F.66), (F.68), and (F.69), we obtain that
‖Θ˜−1K,b‖22 ≤ 1 + 1/2 ·
√
k +m · [1− ρ2(L)]−1 · σ−1min(Σz)
+ min
{
1/2 · [1− ρ2(L)]−1σ−2min(Σz), [1− ρ(L)]−1σ−1min(Σz)}. (F.70)
Now it remains to characterize σmin(Σz). For any vectors s ∈ Rm and r ∈ Rk, we have(
s
r
)⊤
Σz
(
s
r
)
= Ex∼N (µK,b,ΦK),u∼πK,b(· |x)
{[
s⊤(x− µK,b) + r⊤(u+KµK,b − b)
]2}
= Ex∼N (µK,b,ΦK),η∼N (0,I)
{[
(s−K⊤r)⊤(x− µK,b) + σr⊤η
]2}
= Ex∼N (µK,b,ΦK)
{[
(s−K⊤r)⊤(x− µK,b)
]2}
+ Eη∼N (0,I)
[
(σr⊤η)2
]
. (F.71)
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The first term on the RHS of (F.71) is lower bounded as
Ex∼N (µK,b,ΦK)
{[
(s−K⊤r)⊤(x− µK,b)
]2}
= (s−K⊤r)⊤ΦK(s−K⊤r)
≥ ‖s−K⊤r‖22 · σmin(ΦK) ≥ ‖s−K⊤r‖22 · σmin(Ψω), (F.72)
where the last inequality comes from the fact that σmin(ΦK) ≥ σmin(Ψω) by (3.3). The
second term on the RHS of (F.71) takes the form of
Eη∼N (0,I)
[
(σr⊤η)2
]
= σ2‖r‖22. (F.73)
Therefore, combining (F.71), (F.72), and (F.73), we have(
s
r
)⊤
Σz
(
s
r
)
≥ ‖s−K⊤r‖22 · σmin(Ψω) + σ2‖r‖22
≥ σmin(Ψω) · ‖s‖22 +
[
σ2 − ‖K‖22 · σmin(Ψω)
] · ‖r‖22.
From this, we know that
σmin(Σz) ≥ min
{
σmin(Ψω), σ
2 − ‖K‖22 · σmin(Ψω)
}
. (F.74)
Thus, combining (F.70) and (F.74), we know that ‖Θ˜−1K,b‖2 is upper bounded by a constant
λ˜K , where λ˜K only depends on ‖K‖2 and ρ(L) = ρ(A−BK). This finishes the proof of the
lemma.
F.11 Proof of Lemma F.2
Proof. First, note that the cost function c(x, u) takes the following form,
c(x, u) = ψ(x, u)⊤
svec
[
diag(Q,R)
]
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
 + [µ⊤K,bQµK,b + (µuK,b)⊤RµuK,b + µ⊤Qµ].
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For any matrix V and vectors vx, vu, it holds that
EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]⊤svec(V )vx
vu

= EπK,b
ψ(x, u)⊤
svec
[
diag(Q,R)
]
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
ψ(x, u)⊤
svec(V )vx
vu

︸ ︷︷ ︸
D1
(F.75)
+ EπK,b
ψ(x, u)⊤(µ⊤K,bQµK,b + (µuK,b)⊤RµuK,b + µ⊤Qµ)
svec(V )vx
vu

︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2
.
In the sequel, we calculate D1 and D2 respectively.
Calculation of D1. Note that by the definition of ψ(x, u) in (B.5), it holds that
D1 = EπK,b

[
(z − µz)⊤diag(Q,R)(z − µz) + (z − µz)⊤
(
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
)]
·
[
(z − µz)⊤V (z − µz) + (z − µz)⊤
(
vx
vu
)]
= EπK,b
[
(z − µz)⊤diag(Q,R)(z − µz) · (z − µz)⊤V (z − µz)
]
(F.76)
+ EπK,b
[(
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
)⊤
(z − µz)(z − µz)⊤
(
vx
vu
)]
.
Here z = (x⊤, u⊤)⊤ and µz = EπK,b(z). For the first term on the RHS of (F.76), note that
z − µz ∼ N (0,Σz). Therefore, by Lemma G.1, we obtain that
EπK,b
[
(z − µz)⊤diag(Q,R)(z − µz) · (z − µz)⊤V (z − µz)
]
= 2
〈
Σzdiag(Q,R)Σz, V
〉
+
〈
Σz, diag(Q,R)
〉 · 〈Σz, V 〉
= svec
[
2Σzdiag(Q,R)Σz +
〈
Σz, diag(Q,R)
〉 · Σz]⊤svec(V ). (F.77)
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Meanwhile, the second term on the RHS of (F.76) takes the form of
EπK,b
[(
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
)⊤
(z − µz)(z − µz)⊤
(
vx
vu
)]
=
[
Σz
(
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
)]⊤(
vx
vu
)
. (F.78)
Combining (F.76), (F.77), and (F.78), we obtain that
D1 =
2svec
[
Σzdiag(Q,R)Σz + 〈Σz, diag(Q,R)〉Σz
]
Σz
(
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
) 
⊤svec(V )vx
vu
 . (F.79)
Calculation of D2. By the definition of the feature vector ψ(x, u) in (B.5), we know that
D2 = (µ
⊤
K,bQµK,b + (µ
u
K,b)
⊤RµuK,b + µ
⊤Qµ)
svec(Σz)0m
0k

⊤svec(V )vx
vu
 . (F.80)
Now, combining (F.75), (F.79), and (F.80), it holds that
EπK,b
[
c(x, u)ψ(x, u)
]
=
2svec
[
Σzdiag(Q,R)Σz + 〈Σz, diag(Q,R)〉Σz
]
Σz
(
2QµK,b
2RµuK,b
) 
+
[
µ⊤K,bQµK,b + (µ
u
K,b)
⊤RµuK,b + µ
⊤Qµ
]svec(Σz)0m
0k
 ,
which concludes the proof of the lemma.
G Auxiliary Results
Lemma G.1. Assume that the random variable w ∼ N (0, I), and let U and V be two
symmetric matrices, then it holds that
E(w⊤Uw · w⊤V w) = 2 tr(UV ) + tr(U) · tr(V ).
Proof. See Magnus et al. (1978) and Magnus (1979) for a detailed proof.
Lemma G.2. Let M , N be commuting symmetric matrices, and let α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn
denote their eigenvalues with v1, . . . , vn a common basis of orthogonal eigenvectors. Then
the n(n + 1)/2 eigenvalues of M ⊗s N are given by (αiβj + αjβi)/2, where 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
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Proof. See Lemma 2 in Alizadeh et al. (1998) for a detailed proof.
Lemma G.3. For any integer m > 0, let A ∈ Rm×m and η ∼ N (0, Im). Then, there exists
some absolute constant C > 0 such that for any t ≥ 0, we have
P
[∣∣η⊤Aη − E(η⊤Aη)∣∣ > t] ≤ 2 · exp[−C ·min(t2‖A‖−2F , t‖A‖−12 )].
Proof. See Rudelson et al. (2013) for a detailed proof.
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